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ARTICLES
THE PUBLIC HOUSING TENANCY:
VARIATIONS ON THE COMMON LAW
THAT GIVE SECURITY OF TENURE
AND CONTROL
Shelby D. Green*
"A Decent Place to Live"**
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the United States Housing Act' is "to promote the gen-
eral welfare of the Nation by employing its funds and credit... to remedy
the unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of
decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of lower income."2 After
nearly sixty years, and despite the employment of a wide variety of hous-
ing assistance programs providing both in-kind and monetary benefits, 3
the success of the Housing Act in achieving its stated aim is continually
debated. The persistent shortage of adequate housing,4 the dilapidation
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, White Plains, N.Y.
J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; B.S., Towson State College.
** 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (1988).
1. United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1437 to 1437j (1988)) [hereinafter Housing Act].
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1988).
3. Federal housing assistance programs offer in-kind benefits in the form of public
housing, subsidized housing, and Section 8 Existing Housing. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. For
convenience, this article refers to recipients of all three types of benefits as public housing
tenants. Housing programs also include demand-side subsidies, including vouchers, cash
supplements, and cash allowances for recipients to rent housing in the private market, as
well as tax benefits and mortgage insurance to enable recipients to purchase housing. See
infra notes 63-91 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Peter W. Salsich, Jr., A Decent Home for Every American: Can the 1949
Goal Be Met?, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1619 (1993) (discussing the dichotomy in housing for
Americans of different economic means); Michael A. Wolf, HUD and Housing in the
1990s: Crises in Affordability and Accountability, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 545 (1991) (dis-
cussing the widening gap between housing costs and household income and the effective-
ness of Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) programs in addressing
Catholic University Law Review
of public housing projects,' the plague of drug and other criminal activity
in many public housing projects, and the high cost of administering public
housing programs reveal the Act's failure in accomplishing its goal.6
this problem). The increase in housing shortages has paralleled the rise in the national rate
of poverty. Salsich, supra, at 1630-31. A higher rate of poverty or a general decline in the
economy produces a decrease in housing starts in the private sector. Over the past two
decades, slower real income growth and higher real housing costs have exacerbated the
problem of housing shortages for low- and moderate-income households. Joirr CENTER
FOR Hous. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2, 15
(1991) [hereinafter STATE OF HOUSING]. Low-income families disproportionately suffer
from the effects of a housing shortage because they are unable to outbid more affluent
parties for this scarce resource.
In addition to a decline in the rate of new housing starts, from the mid-1970s to the mid-
1980s, more than 4.5 million housing units were demolished or structurally converted, per-
manently removing them from the nation's housing stock. NATIONAL HoUs. TASK FORCE,
A DECENT PLACE TO LIVE 6 (1988) [hereinafter HOUSING TASK FORCE].
The same economic factors have stifled the growth of new publicly-owned housing. Be-
tween 1965 and 1985, starts of publicly owned housing dramatically decreased-from
36,900 to 3100 units, a decline of 91.6%. See Fenna Pit & Willem van Vliet, Public Housing
in the United States, in HANDBOOK OF HOUSING AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 199, 201 (Elizabeth Huttman & Willem van Vliet eds., 1988) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK OF HOUSING]. See generally Lawrence B. Simons, Toward a New National
Housing Policy, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 259 (1988) (suggesting that a new housing policy
is needed to address changing housing demands).
5. As early as 1957, housing experts and commentators found little to praise in public
housing. They criticized the rigidity and paternalism in management, crudity and segrega-
tion in project design, and a deplorable fragmentation of general housing policy. Catherine
Bauer, The Dreary Deadlock of Public Housing, ARCHITECTURAL F., May 1957, at 140,
140 (arguing that the public housing initiatives of the New Deal failed to achieve their
goals); see Pit & van Viiet, supra note 4, at 212. Commentators cited public housing's
interior-space deficiencies, unimaginative exterior designs, and poor location planning.
These deficiencies "were exacerbated in the late 1950s and 1960s when economizing meas-
ures contributed to increasingly 'functional' designs that failed to take account of the soci-
obehavioral needs of the tenant." Id. Furthermore, commentators contended that public
housing design failures resulted from social prejudice and the use of military standardiza-
tion techniques. At that time, governments believed that public housing should be
designed with minimum space and no frills because such amenities should be provided only
to those who could climb the social ladder on their own. Id. at 214.
6. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE
EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 11 (1988) [hereinafter PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION]. The Com-
mission reported that, in 1988, the cost of constructing new public housing was approxi-
mately two and one-half times greater than the cost of housing provided through existing
rental markets and that the cost of new subsidized housing was approximately twice the
existing market rate. Id. On a monthly basis, new construction of public housing cost
almost $700 per unit; whereas housing obtained with vouchers cost about $300 per month.
Id. The report explained that the differential is partly a function of higher operating costs.
Id.; see UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HoUS. AND URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND
RESEARCH, ALTERNATIVE OPERATING SUBSIDY SYSTEMS FOR THE PUBLIC HOUSING PRO.
GRAM V, 306-26 (1982) (discussing the principles and cost of the voucher system) [herein-
after PROGRAM V].
In the debate over the cost of housing programs, in-kind assistance, whereby public
housing is provided, is compared with direct income supplements and direct payments to
[Vol. 43:681
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Some commentators have proposed privatization as a means of correcting
these failures. 7
In general, "privatization" refers to a shift of governmental functions
from the public to the private sector.' Privatization is based on the belief
that the transfer of control over the distribution of government benefits
from a public employee to a private entrepreneur will lead to significant
improvements in performance.9 Proponents of privatization assert that
such improvements will result because the private sector can provide
goods and services more efficiently than the government."° In simple
economic terms, privatization is grounded in the theory that the most effi-
cient result is attained if the process is guided solely by economic self-
interest, rather than political or social policy." The privatization move-
ment achieved perhaps its greatest momentum during the previous two
lessors of existing housing. Rachel G. Bratt, Public Housing: The Controversy and Contri-
bution, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 335, 350 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds.,
1986). Additionally, in-kind assistance is compared with other subsidized new construction
programs. Id. One commentator argued that only the second comparison is legitimate.
Id. Studies show that, at worst, the cost of operating existing public housing developments
is approximately equal to the cost of direct payments to lessors of existing housing. Id.
The debate can be characterized as follows:
First .... the comparison [between in-kind assistance and direct payments] is not a
fair one because, in the case of public housing, new units are built, and in the
housing allowance programs they are not, it is less costly to subsidize a household
through [direct payments to lessors in existing housing] than to subsidize the con-
struction of a new unit of public housing. Second, the cost of subsidizing house-
holds in existing public housing units is no higher than the cost of subsidizing
households in existing private units .... Third, no conclusions can be drawn about
the cost of building new public housing in comparison to other subsidized new
construction programs.
Id. at 353-54.
7. See Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARO. L. REV.
449 (1988) (discussing rationales supporting and opposing privatization); Robert C. Ellick-
son, The Legal Dimension of the Privatization Movement, GEO. MASON U. L. REV., Winter
1988, at 157 (discussing the relationship between the Constitution and privatization);
Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public
Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878 (1990) (reviewing the privatization theory and arguing
that federal housing assistance for low-income families should consist of housing al-
lowances and vouchers, relying to a greater extent on the private sector for the delivery of
services).
8. Schill, supra note 7, at 881.
9. See id. at 882.
10. See id. at 882-87, 900. The proposition may reflect nothing more than the popular
belief in the superiority of private enterprise over the presumed intrinsic evil of public
ownership. EUGENE J. MEEHAN, THE QUALITY OF FEDERAL POLICYMAKING: PROGRAM-
MED FAILURE IN PUBLIC HOUSING 136 (1979) (commenting on the privatization concept).
11. See generally Richard P. Appelbaum & John I. Gilderbloom, Supply-Side Eco-
nomics and Rents: Are Rental Housing Markets Truly Competitive?, in CRITICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES ON HOUSING, supra note 6, at 165 (discussing the inapplicability of traditional
supply-side economics to the urban housing market).
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presidential administrations. 2
In the public housing context, privatization calls for the government to
withdraw from the business of providing in-kind housing assistance."l
Two methods of privatizing public housing have been proposed. The first
requires selling off or demolishing the federal stock of public housing fa-
cilities, terminating all monetary subsidies to housing projects, and substi-
tuting a program in which low-income families would receive vouchers or
cash allowances to obtain housing in the private market. 4 The second
method works in a more sinister fashion, through drastic, but invited,
budget reductions.' 5
12. In 1988, the President's Commission on Privatization recommended the privatiza-
tion of a broad array of existing governmental services, including education, prison admin-
istration, and low-income housing construction. PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION, supra note
6; Schill, supra note 7, at 878. With respect to low-income housing, the Commission recom-
mended the sale of public housing units to tenants at discounted prices. PRIVATIZATION
COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 17-18; Schill, supra note 7, at 878. In the same year, Con-
gress passed legislation to facilitate these sales. See Schill, supra note 7, at 878, 879.
13. See PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 16-18 (suggesting that the gov-
ernment should sell some of the public housing stock to tenants). In 1982, the President's
Commission, reflecting the privatization movement, did not support construction of new
housing as a method for providing government housing assistance. Id. at 13.
14. Id. at 14-18. In 1982, then Secretary of HUD, Samuel Pierce, submitted a report
to Congress proposing alternative housing subsidy systems that would base payments to
agencies administering in-kind housing programs (public housing agencies (PHAs)) on a
private rent index, which would represent the costs of supplying private market rental
housing to families currently living in public housing. Public housing tenants would receive
a direct federal subsidy in the form of a voucher, either to remain in public housing or to
move to a private market unit that met the voucher program's housing quality standards.
PROGRAM V, supra note 6, at xxiii. PHAs could charge rents by the same method as a
private landlord. Id. This last alternative envisioned that some existing housing projects
would disappear entirely. Id. at 306-08.
15. In the 1980s, the secretary of HUD forced a reluctant Congress to cut HUD's
housing budget by two-thirds, from $23.8 billion to $6.1 billion. Ira S. Lowry, Housing
Policy for the 1990s: A Planner's Guide, J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N, Winter 1989, at 93, 94; see
Michael A. Stegman & J. David Holden, NONFEDERAL HOUSING PROGRAMS 9 (1987) (ex-
plaining the federal government's decreasing role towards housing assistance in the 1980s);
Mary K. Nenno, Reagan's '88 Budget: Dismantling HUD, 44 J. Hous. 103 (1987) (analyz-
ing the Reagan administration's funding of HUD programs). See generally M.H. Hoeflich
& John E. Thies, Rethinking American Housing Policy: Defederalizing Subsidized Housing,
1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 629 (commenting on the benefits of privatization and federal govern-
ment involvement in housing).
In its 1986 budget proposal, the Reagan administration called for a cut of $600 million in
operating subsidies to public housing agencies, a decrease from $1.7 billion to $175 million
for the modernization of existing housing facilities (to meet emergency needs only) and a
one-year freeze on "fair market rents" under the Section 8 programs. Chester Hartman,
Housing Policies Under the Reagan Administration, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON Hous-
ING, supra note 6, at 362, 365-66, 373.
The most recent privatization effort is the proposed Housing Voucher Act of 1993, H.R.
1124, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill proposes to withdraw federal assistance for
new construction of public housing. Id. §§ 2-4. Federal funds would instead be appropri-
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The idea that the availability and quality of housing will be determined
solely by the ability of persons seeking housing to pay rent at market
rates provides the rationale for the method of cash allowances.16 To a
great extent, however, this notion is false. In reality, decisions by prop-
erty owners to enter into or to refuse to enter into landlord-tenant rela-
tionships are also based upon factors that do not reflect economic
rationality. "Nonmonetary" factors such as racism, low-income status,
family composition, and receipt of public benefits operate to exclude low-
income families from available housing in the private sector to at least the
same degree as monetary limitations. 7 In the past, even public housing
agencies receiving federal assistance excluded families on the basis of
some of these factors.' 8 Moreover, private lease law, to the extent that it
does not afford the private sector tenant any form of tenancy security
beyond the lease term and gives little control over the other terms of the
landlord-tenant relationship, can deny low-income families a decent place
to live, even when they are able to pay market-rate rent. The cash allow-
ance method, therefore, considers only one aspect of the housing ques-
tion-the economic predicate of acquisition-while ignoring the
sociological impediments and jurisprudential constraints associated with
obtaining adequate housing.
The legal rules governing the "public housing tenancy," while rooted in
the common law, have evolved to mitigate the harsh effects of the eco-
nomic and noneconomic factors that determine the availability and qual-
ated to provide cash allowances to low-income families to rent dwelling units owned and
operated by private landlords. Id. § 5.
16. The problem of affordability has been identified as the most critical housing prob-
lem of the 1990s. Since affordability and housing supply are interdependent issues, af-
fordability restricts the production of new housing. The price of housing is set by supply
and demand. See Appelbaum & Gilderbloom, supra note 11, at 165, 167. In a tight hous-
ing market, homelessness is at its highest level because of the degree of competition for
available private units. Id. In order for low-income families to manage in this type of
market under cash allowance programs, they must have sufficient resources to outbid
others. Id.
17. See James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second
Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1050-51 (1989) (examining the con-
nection between housing and civil rights issues).
18. A provision in the Housing Act of 1949 manifests the early congressional response
to this kind of discrimination. It provided that public housing agencies receiving public
funds could not discriminate against families whose incomes derived in whole or in part
from public assistance. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, § 301(8)(c), 63 Stat. 413, 423 (super-
seded in the 1974 general revision of the Housing Act of 1937 by Pub. L. No. 93-383,
§ 201(a), 88 Stat. 633, 653 (1974)). The Fair Housing Act, the civil rights acts, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act were subsequently enacted and amended to address hous-
ing discrimination on the basis of race, religion, gender, and family status. See Gautreaux
v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (finding that discriminatory
selection of public housing project sites is prohibited by federal law).
1994]
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ity of public housing. This Article explores the character of the public
housing tenancy, comparing it with the common law tenancy under pri-
vate lease law and evaluating the degree to which private lease law will
protect the interests of low-income families if current proposals to abolish
existing in-kind housing programs are adopted. Part II of this Article
traces the history of federally funded housing programs and describes the
various strategies employed. Part III discusses the recent changes in
modern private lease law and recounts the basic rights and obligations of
the landlord and tenant, which define and govern the rights of low-in-
come families under a cash allowance program. Part IV describes the
evolution of the public housing tenancy and demonstrates how its devel-
opment has outpaced that of the common law tenancy. Part V explores
the legal and social policy implications of dismantling the in-kind housing
programs. Part VI concludes that the public housing tenancy is necessary
to protect public housing tenants from victimization under private lease
law.
II. ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL HISTORY
The United States Housing Act of 1937, which was a New Deal mea-
sure passed at the height of the Great Depression, established public
housing programs. 9 During the Depression, private construction of resi-
dential housing came to a virtual halt.20 Consequently, with no new
mortgages to issue, banks foreclosed existing mortgages at a rate of more
than a thousand per day by 1933.21 Those who lost their homes had to
move to slum tenements because decent, affordable housing was unavail-
able.22 In 1937, there was little public control over the quality, type, and
location of housing, except those standards imposed by the tenement
codes in the nation's largest cities. 23 These codes were enacted, however,
not to address housing shortages, but rather, to address slum housing con-
ditions that were thought to threaten the public health and well-being,
such as diseases (smallpox, dysentery, tuberculosis), fire hazards, and
19. United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1437 to 1437j (1988)).
20. The Depression caused the rates of construction of residential property and ex-
penditures on home repairs to fall by more than 90%. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS
FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 187 (1985).
21. In 1926, banks foreclosed about 68,000 homes; in 1930 this number rose to about
130,000, increasing to nearly 200,000 in 1931 and to 250,000 in 1932. Id. at 188-89. In the
spring of 1933, 50% of all home mortgages were technically in default, and foreclosures
reached the rate of more than one thousand per day. Id.
22. Bratt, supra note 6, at 337-38.
23. See Roger A. Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranties of Habita-
bility in Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN. 3, 10-14 (1979).
[Vol. 43:681
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crime." The codes, which were usually only applicable to multiple-family
dwellings, typically "prescribed minimum standards for fire safety, venti-
lation, sanitation, and weather-tightness of roofs."'25 The codes were not
designed to guarantee a decent home, as originally envisioned by Con-
gress when it passed the Housing Act.26
The period preceding the Depression has been described as the classi-
cal period in the history of American contract and property law-a pe-
riod which embraced laissez-faire economics and defended vested
property interests.27 In contract law, the prevailing principle obligated
the courts simply to enforce contracts, unexceptional on other grounds,28
precisely as the parties had made them. 29 According to utilitarian and
Kantian notions, contract law would promote justice because it permitted
parties to contract freely and enforced the result of such freely-made
agreement.3 ° While all property interests were protected, the law favored
entrepreneurial property interests over rentier interests, as well as com-
mercial and large-scale pursuits over the pursuits of farmers, artisans, and
the working class.31 In the area of private lease law, this preference
24. Peter Marcuse, Housing Policy and the Myth of the Benevolent State, in CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING, supra note 6, at 248, 250-51.
25. Id. at 249; see Cunningham, supra note 23, at 11 (noting code requirements on
sanitation for "'good and sufficient water closets or privies'" (quoting 1867 N.Y. LAWS,
ch. 908, §§ 1-19)); Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant
Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 503, 518-19 (1982) (citing New York and Massachusetts code provi-
sions requiring landlords to maintain the premises). In 1867, New York was the first state
to enact a tenement code. These laws were prototypes for the modern housing code. Cun-
ningham, supra note 23, at 10-11; Glendon, supra, at 519. Housing codes did not, however,
become common until the mid-1950s. Cunningham, supra note 23, at 13.
26. Nathan Straus, End the Slums, in NEW DEAL THOUGHT 158, 160-61 (Howard Zinn
ed., 1966).
27. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 396-97 (1973); JAMES
W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM 10-11 (1956); Glendon, supra note
25, at 509; Michael E. Parrish, The Great Depression, the New Deal, and the American
Legal Order, 59 WASH. L. REV. 723, 724 (1984).
28. Exceptions recognized by the courts included instances in which a party alleged
illegality, fraud, mistake, or demanded public policy. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CON-
TRACT LAW IN AMERICA 15-16 (1965).
29. Id. at 98. Friedman argues that contract law changed through the application and
expansion of the concepts of fraud and mistake as a means of mitigating the harshness of
the classical law. Id. at 99.
30. HURST, supra note 27, at 10-11.
31. See Parrish, supra note 27, at 724; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 27, at 157-247
(discussing the impact of law on the economy between 1776 and 1847); MORTON J. HOR-
WITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 212 (1977); Harry N.
Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government: The
United States, 1789-1910, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 232, 233-34 (1973). Parrish notes that recent
historical works have reconceptualized the legal order during this period and have demon-
strated that the law held preferences for those rules and property interests that favored
economic growth. Parrish, supra note 27, at 724.
19941
Catholic University Law Review
meant that a landlord had no duty to the tenant except to deliver the
premises.32
On a national scale, the Depression produced a stagnant economy and
astounding levels of unemployment-in 1937, one-quarter of the work
force was unemployed. 33 As a result, a new group of poor emerged, com-
prised of former members of the middle class, mostly white, who had
enjoyed the prosperity of the twenties. 34 Poverty became visible, remark-
able, and, in the view of many, undeserved.35
Few pretend that the original Housing Act was solely an act of char-
ity.36 Professor Friedman writes that it is a mistake to suppose that the
32. During the classical period of American contract and property law, the landlord's
principal obligation was to give the tenant the exclusive possession of the premises. John
A. Humbach, The Common-Law Conception of Leasing: Mitigation, Habitability, and De-
pendence of Covenants, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 1213, 1261-62 (1983). This required conveyance
of a nonfreehold possessory "estate" under the common law. Aside from his reversion, the
landlord had no rights in and no obligation regarding the property's physical condition or
its state of repair during the term of the lease. Id. at 1263-64. A tenant's remedies against
a landlord were limited to cases where there had been an actual or constructive eviction.
The tenant's principal obligation was to pay rent. This obligation was premised on the
notion developed under early English common law that rent issued from the land. See id.
at 1225-28. Therefore, so long as the tenant retained possession of the land, even if the
buildings thereon were destroyed, the duty to pay rent continued. Id. at 1232. Under early
common law, a landlord could expressly covenant to maintain the leased premises. Id. at
1263-64. In addition to an implied warranty that there were no latent defects in the prem-
ises, a landlord was held to an implied warranty of fitness for furnished dwellings. See id.
at 1267-68.
33. Approximately fourteen million Americans were unemployed by early 1933. Law-
rence M. Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54 CAL. L. REV. 642, 645
(1966) [hereinafter Public Housing].
34. Id. at 645-47, 649, 651-52; Pit & van Vliet, supra note 4, at 201. The 1920s wit-
nessed a decade-long bull market where "middle-class Americans were told that they could
reap high profits by blindly investing in just about any collection of common stocks." J.
Bradford De Long, What Morgan Wrought, WILSON Q., Autumn 1992, at 17, 26-27; see
EDGAR L. SMITH, COMMON STOCKS AS LONG TERM INVESTMENTS 76-80 (1934) (explain-
ing the stock market's increase in value from the mid-1800s to the 1920s). The subsequent
crash of the market was an important factor in the general depression of the middle class.
35. Public Housing, supra note 33, at 645-46. This growing population of former mid-
dle-class persons among the poor prompted immediate legislation. Friedman explains that
these former middle-class persons
retained their middle-class culture and their outlook, their articulateness, their
habit of expressing their desires at the polls. There were, therefore, millions of
candidates for public housing who did not belong (as later was true) to the class
of the "problem poor"; rather they were members of what we might call the sub-
merged middle class.... Public housing was not supported by the dregs of society;
a discontented army of men and women of high demands and high expectations
stood ready to insist on decent housing from government or at least stood ready
to approve and defend it.
Id.
36. Id. at 646 (explaining that lawmakers perceived public housing to be a stimulus to
jobs and business); Marcuse, supra note 24, at 249-52 (noting that public housing was used
[Vol. 43:681
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Housing Act "arose solely out of a gradual persuasion of decent-minded
people that the slums were odious, crowded, and evil, and that the federal
government had a duty to relieve the sufferings of the poor," since re-
formers long before the Depression had worked to achieve public hous-
ing without sufficient results.37 Other historians note that public housing
programs arose from concerns about social unrest among unemployed
city workers and that the New Deal housing programs were intended to
address those concerns.38 These programs featured provisions for better
housing and, more significantly, additional jobs.39
During the Depression, the public housing provision was not thought
to have a public purpose, at least as it would justify the condemnation of
private property by the government.4 ° United States v. Certain Lands in
the City of Louisville,4' a federal appeals court decision, reflected this
view. The court found that the Progress Works Administration (PWA)
had the power of eminent domain for public purposes, but the construc-
tion of public housing did not constitute such a purpose.42 This ruling
seemed to foreclose most federal government programs providing for the
direct construction of public housing. 43 The exercise of the eminent do-
main power by local governments for public housing purposes, however,
had already been tested and upheld in state courts. 44 Congress, there-
as a means to facilitate economic productivity and social control); Pit & van Vliet, supra
note 4, at 205 (noting that public housing programs were intended to stimulate depressed
industry, create jobs, and provide affordable housing to the poor).
37. Public Housing, supra note 33, at 645. Another historian comments that:
The New Dealers themselves were articulate, humane, and on occasion
profound.... They had no clearly defined set of goals, beyond that of extricating
the nation from the depression of 1929-32. In the course of easing the crisis,
however, they found themselves-pushed partly by the cries of alarm on all sides,
partly by inner humanitarian impulses-creating new laws and institutions like
the Tennessee Valley Authority, the social security system, farm subsidies, mini-
mum wage standards, the National Labor Relations Board, and public housing.
HOWARD ZINN, THE POLITICS OF HISTORY 118 (1970); see WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 1932-1940, at 134-35 (1963) (commenting
on the social, economic, and political repercussions of the New Deal); Jerold S. Auerbach,
New Deal, Old Deal, or Raw Deal: Some Thoughts on New Left Historiography, J. S. HIST.,
Feb. 1969, at 18 (same).
38. Marcuse, supra note 24, at 254.
39. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 37, at 134.
40. Under the National Industrial Recovery Act, which provided for the creation of
the Public Works Administration (PWA), the federal government sought to condemn pri-
vate property in order to construct public housing. Jane L. McGrew & Ana Fabregas, The
Housing Act of 1937: Legal Origins, 44 J. Hous. 156, 156 (1987).
41. 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 726 (1936).
42. Id. at 686.
43. Because of powerful opposition by various interest groups, an appeal of the deci-
sion was withdrawn. See McGrew & Fabregas, supra note 40, at 157.
44. See, e.g., New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936); see also
1994]
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fore, was able to enact the Housing Act, which vested the United States
Housing Authority with the power to make grants and loans to local
housing agencies for the acquisition, development, and administration of
housing for low-income families. 45
President Roosevelt attempted to address the economic effects of the
Depression by devising social welfare and relief programs that would ad-
dress the basic human needs of the benefit recipients, while creating new
jobs and stimulating business without placing the government in competi-
tion with the private sector.46 In the context of public housing, this strat-
egy meant that the government would only provide housing to those who
could not possibly afford to obtain it on their own. Tenants, however,
were not given public housing for free. They were given only a subsidy to
cover the unpaid required market-rate rent, ensuring that housing
projects would be occupied by "poor but honest workers. '47 Public hous-
ing, therefore, was provided in a manner that minimized competition with
housing available in the private sector.4 ' To avoid a housing oversupply,
Myres S. McDougal and Addison A. Mueller, Public Purpose in Public Housing: An
Anachronism Reburied, 52 YALE L.J. 42, 45-47 (1943) (explaining that other courts deter-
mined state expenditures on "activities such as gasoline filling stations, tourists' camps,
public golf courses, ice plants, municipal celebrations, city bands, and opera houses" to be
within the "public purpose").
45. Congress enacted the Housing Act of 1949, which created the Urban Renewal
Program and provided direct subsidies to local governmental agencies to clear decaying
areas and provide sites for moderately priced housing. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63
Stat. 413 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988)). As part of the Act, Congress
authorized the construction of an additional 800,000 public housing units and established
the national housing policy of "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every
American family." Id. The Housing Act of 1954 broadened urban renewal plans to in-
clude conservation and rehabilitation requirements. Housing Act of 1954, ch. 649, § 302,
68 Stat. 622 (superseded in the 1974 general revision of the Housing Act of 1937 by Pub. L.
No. 93-383, § 116, 88 Stat. 633, 652 (1974)).
46. See Straus, supra note 26, at 163 (noting that public housing programs did not
contemplate competition with private industry); see also LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 37, at
134-35 (commenting that the purpose of the housing program was to stimulate jobs and
business); Pit & van Vliet, supra note 4, at 205 (same).
47. See Public Housing, supra note 33, at 648; see also Bratt, supra note 6, at 338-39.
During the debate, Senator Wagner stated, "[t]here are some people whom we cannot
possibly reach; I mean those who have no means to pay the rent minus the subsidy." 81
CONG. REC. 8099 (1937).
48. The 1937 Act provided housing subsidies to low-income families who could not
"afford to pay enough to cause private enterprise in their locality.., to build an adequate
supply of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for their use." Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896,
§ 2(2), 50 Stat. 888 (superseded in the 1974 general revision of the Housing Act of 1937 by
Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974)). A low-income family was one "whose net income
at the time of admission [did] not exceed five times the rental" cost. Id. § 2(1) (footnote
omitted). For families with three or more minor dependents, the ratio was six to one. Id.
The 1949 Act provided that no annual contributions contract could be entered into un-
less the local public housing agency demonstrated "that a gap of at least 20 per centum has
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no public housing units could be built without destroying an equal
number of existing private sector units, incidentally achieving the end of
slum clearance.49
Eventually, the New Deal economic recovery measures revived the
economy and the submerged middle class. By the early 1950s, the middle
class resumed its original place in the economic hierarchy.5 0 As the mid-
dle class emerged from public housing,5 World War II shifted national
priorities away from public housing construction.52 The end of the war
produced a different class of persons asserting a claim to public housing
subsidies-veterans.5 Indeed, the legal and moral claims of veterans
forced the adoption of an aggressive strategy to remove the revived mid-
dle class from public housing, where it had grown comfortable and
wanted to remain.54
During the 1950s, another group, comprised largely of blacks, immi-
been left between the upper rental limits for admission to the proposed low-rent housing
and the lowest rents at which private enterprise unaided by public subsidy is providing...
decent, safe, and sanitary housing." Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, § 301(7)(b), 63 Stat. 413,
422 (superseded in the 1974 general revision of the Housing Act of 1937 by Pub. L. No. 93-
383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974)).
49. See ch. 896, § 15, 50 Stat. 888, 895 (superseded by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437c, 1437d,
1437f); see also LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 37, at 133-34 (discussing the failures of the
PWA's slum clearance); Bratt, supra note 6, at 337 (describing the "equivalent elimina-
tion" process).
50. Friedman cites a typical example and explains that in 1944, with rising incomes and
the federal housing subsidy, one-quarter of the families in public housing were able to save
enough money to buy their own homes. Public Housing, supra note 33, at 649. Other
historians explain that although there were still nine million unemployed, the New Deal
began to wane in 1938 and 1939 because its urgency was gone.
What the New Deal did was to refurbish middle-class America, which had
taken a dizzying fall in the depression, to restore jobs to half the jobless, and to
give just enough to the lowest classes (a layer of public housing, a minimum of
social security) to create an aura of good will.
ZINN, supra note 37, at 119.
51. For the middle class, moving away from "public housing" did not mean giving up
federal housing assistance. Instead, middle-class relief took the form of federal mortgage
insurance and tax benefits. For a further discussion of these types of federal housing assist-
ance, see infra text accompanying notes 83-91.
52. Pit & van Vliet, supra note 4, at 206. The authors report that when the war began,
fewer than 40,000 public housing units had been constructed. Id. Thus, when economic
efforts were directed at the war, the serious housing shortage continued. Id.
53. The National Defense Housing Amendment, for example, authorized the Housing
Administrator to use his powers "to provide housing for distressed families of servicemen
and for veterans and their families." National Defense Housing Amendment, ch. 192,
§ 501, 59 Stat. 260 (1945) (repealed by executive order). In 1946, the Veterans' Emergency
Housing Act was passed, creating an emergency housing plan to benefit World War II
veterans. Veterans Emergency Housing Act, ch. 268, 60 Stat. 207 (1946) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1738, 1739, 1743 (1988)).
54. See Public Housing, supra note 33, at 650-51.
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grants from the South, and female-headed and elderly households, took
the veterans' place in public housing.55 Unlike prior inhabitants of public
housing, this group did not generate any sympathy. It could offer no
causes to champion, nor could it convince the nation that its need was the
result of some fault other than its own.56 In this latest era, fringe areas of
cities and suburban communities resisted the introduction of public hous-
ing. As a result, the new group of public housing claimants was confined
to the cores of cities. 7 Unlike land in the undisturbed suburbs, however,
urban land had to be purchased, cleared, and redeveloped, making urban
residence more expensive. 8 The higher price for public housing made
cost-cutting measures inevitable.59 Aesthetic interest was no longer an
essential element of any public housing construction project. Instead of
low-rise developments on sprawling acres,6" local housing agencies built
concentrated high-rise structures.6' These projects suffered the effects of
their circumstances, including crime, producing calls for reform of the
housing projects and of the conduct of the problem poor.62
55. PROGRAM V, supra note 6, at 2-3; Public Housing, supra note 33, at 651; see also
DANIEL R. FUSFELD & TIMOTHY BATES, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE URBAN
GHETTO 45-66 (1984) (describing the urbanization of African-Americans during the World
War II era).
56. See Public Housing, supra note 33, at 654-55 (discussing the correlation between
an increase in the number of African-American poor in public housing and the decline in
quality and popularity of public housing programs). Friedman explains that:
The [public housing] program could adapt only with difficulty to its new condi-
tions, because it had been originally designed for a different clientele. To suit the
programs to the needs of the new tenant would require fresh legislation; and yet
change would be difficult to enact and to implement precisely because the new
clientele would be so poor, so powerless, so inarticulate. The political attractive-
ness of public housing would diminish. Maladaptations to reality in the program
would disenchant housing reformers; they would declare the program a failure
and abandon it to search out fresh cures for bad housing and slums.
Id. at 649.
57. Id. at 652.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. For example, in 1944, the Middletown Gardens project in Indiana consisted of "a
'112-unit low-rent housing community built on an 80-acre outlying tract: 15 acres in houses,
33 in gardens, 7 a recreation grove, 4 a ball field, 21 untouched timber.' " Id. at 649 (quot-
ing 1 J. OF HOUSING 47 (1944)).
61. Id. at 652; Marcuse, supra note 24, at 259. Recently, HUD reported that 32% of
all public housing projects are multifamily garden apartments, 16% are low-rise walkups,
27% are high-rise buildings, and 25% are single-family detached or townhouse units. PRO-
GRAM V, supra note 6, at 3. Almost two-thirds of all public housing projects are in urban
locations, while 23% are suburban and 13% rural. Moreover, about 30% of public housing
projects are in neighborhoods predominantly populated by minority residents. Id.; see
Bratt, supra note 6, at 344 (reporting public housing statistics and describing current public
housing conditions as satisfactory).
62. In response, public housing agencies adopted strict rules to control the conduct of
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A. Politics and Forms of Federal Housing Assistance
Federal housing policy is manifested in four broad categories of hous-
ing assistance programs: (1) providing funding to local agencies for the
construction of public housing projects (public housing); (2) providing di-
rect payments to owners of existing housing who then provide housing to
low-income families (Section 8 Existing Housing); (3) providing funds to
private housing builders (subsidized housing); and (4) providing funds di-
rectly to housing consumers who then use the funds to obtain housing in
the private sector (demand-side subsidies).63 From their inception until
the early 1960s, federal housing efforts focused on the first category, pub-
lic housing. From the early 1960s until the 1970s, efforts focused on the
second and third categories, Section 8 and subsidized housing. In the
1980s, business groups and their political supporters advocated programs
in the fourth group, demand-side subsidies.64
By focusing on public housing, New Deal politicians thought that the
direct provision of in-kind housing would best achieve the dual aims of
Roosevelt's strategy, that is, providing relief to those in need, while
avoiding competition with private business interests. Demand-side subsi-
dies were rejected on the assumptions that they were unworkable, more
costly, and ineffective in creating additional housing. In addition, New
Deal politicians thought that such subsidies would fail to eliminate sub-
standard housing, and would only cause an increase in the number of
families on the relief rolls.65 Conversely, contemporary proponents of
the demand-side subsidies approach argue that such subsidies would en-
courage both rehabilitation of existing housing and construction of new
tenants. See infra text accompanying notes 303-13 (discussing the various rules and poli-
cies adopted toward these ends).
63. See John R. Nolon, Reexamining Federal Housing Programs in a Time of Fiscal
Austerity: The Trend Toward Block Grants and Housing Allowances, 14 URB. LAW. 249,
250 (1982) (summarizing public housing proposals made during the Reagan
administration).
64. See id.; see also R. Allen Hays, Housing Subsidy Strategies in the United States: A
Typology, in HANDBOOK OF HOUSING, supra note 4, at 183, 188-89; J. Paul Mitchell, The
Historical Context for Housing Policy, in FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS 3, 3-
17 (J. Paul Mitchell ed., 1985) (discussing federal housing programs in the post-World War
II era); Pit & van Vliet, supra note 4, at 200 (explaining various definitions of public hous-
ing); Simons, supra note 4, at 264-68 (reviewing the shift from supply-side to demand-side
housing subsidies during the 1980s).
65. See Marc Bendick, Jr. & Raymond J. Struyk, Origins of An Experimental Ap-
proach, in HOUSING VOUCHERS FOR THE POOR: LESSONS FROM A NATIONAL EXPERIMENT
23, 25-26 (Raymond J. Struyk & Marc Bendick, Jr. eds., 1981) (explaining the advantages
and disadvantages of demand-side housing allowances); see also Bernard J. Frieden, The
Housing Allowance as a Subsidy Approach, in HANDBOOK OF HOUSING, supra note 4, at
237, 237 (same).
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housing, since these payments would increase the demand for housing.66
Furthermore, proponents argue that demand-side subsidies would pro-
vide benefits that could be limited to the persons, amounts, and time peri-
ods actually needed, thereby avoiding the stigma of providing "housing
relief. ,67
1. Public Housing
Congress adopted the federal public housing program advocated dur-
ing the New Deal through the enactment of the Housing Act of 1937,
which incorporated programs in the broad category of public housing.68
While federally funded in part, public housing is owned directly by Public
Housing Agencies (PHAs), 69 which are local municipal corporations cre-
ated pursuant to state legislation for the purpose of constructing, owning,
and operating housing for low-income households.70 Under the Housing
Act, a PHA and the federal government execute a contract setting out
their respective rights and obligations.71 The PHA finances the land
purchase and housing construction by issuing long-term bonds, which typ-
ically have a forty-year maturity.72 The federal government subsidizes
the project by assuming all debt service payments on the bonds or by
making direct loans and grants to fund the construction of public hous-
66. See Bendick & Struyk, supra note 65, at 25.
67. Id. at 26. In 1953, Congress reconsidered demand-side strategies, but once again
acted in favor of retaining a supply-side framework featuring in-kind benefits. Id. at 25;
see PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMM. ON Gov'T Hous. POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, GOVERN-
MENT HOUSING POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 5-20 (1953) (stating that any action taken by the
government would support "a strong, free, [and] competitive economy"). In 1968, a presi-
dential commission appointed to study housing programs and their impact on households
and housing markets recommended an experiment using the demand-side housing allow-
ance approach. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON URBAN Hous., A DECENT HOME 14 (1968). See
infra notes 93-104 and accompanying text (discussing the experiment). The committee
based its recommendation on the fact that increasing suburban resistance to public housing
projects was forcing such projects into urban slum areas. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON URBAN
Hous., supra. This raised concerns over the "ghettoization" of the poor and minority ben-
eficiaries of public housing. See id. The committee believed that a housing allowance sys-
tem would reduce economic dependence on slum housing by increasing demand for
standard units, thereby inducing suppliers to upgrade slum properties or commence new
construction. See id.
68. ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq. (1988)).
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437a-1437e, 1437g-1437m (1988).
70. Id. A PHA is typically governed by a board of commissioners appointed by the
mayor and city council of the jurisdiction in which it is located. The administration of the
PHA is usually vested in an executive or managing director and his or her staff. Id.
§ 1437a(b)(6).
71. Id. 88 1437b-1437c.
72. Id. § 1437b(a).
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ing.73 Initially, only construction and financing costs were paid by the
government, leaving operating and maintenance costs to be covered by
rents collected from public housing tenants. In the 1960s, however, sharp
increases in operating and maintenance costs prompted PHAs to defer
maintenance while still charging higher rents. In response to this trend,
Congress originally imposed a rent ceiling of twenty-five percent of a ten-
ant's income, and began providing operating subsidies to PHAs.74
2. Section 8 Existing Housing Program
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 created the
Section 8 program.75 Originally, the Program comprised several sub-
programs, including new construction, substantial rehabilitation, and ex-
isting housing.76 Under the Section 8 Program, housing is owned by
private parties who enter into contracts with PHAs to provide the hous-
ing to eligible low-income families.77 In exchange, the private owners re-
ceive direct government payments equal to the difference between the
fair market rent on the Section 8 housing and the rent that the tenant can
afford to pay, an amount limited to thirty percent of the tenant's in-
come.78 Housing will qualify as Section 8 housing when the units meet
government quality standards and have a market rental value no greater
than an amount that HUD determines to represent a fair market rent for
suitable housing in that locality.79
Under the Section 8 Housing Voucher Program, low-income families
are given vouchers to obtain housing in the private market. The amount
of the voucher represents fair market rent, but recipients may pay more if
they choose to spend more of their own funds, or may pay less and keep
the difference, provided that they find a unit in suitable condition. The
73. Id.
74. Hays, supra note 64, at 184.
75. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, sec. 201,
§§ 1-12, 88 Stat. 633, 662 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1988)). This Act
eliminated most of the previously established urban development programs, including the
Urban Renewal Program and most housing subsidy programs. The Act also expanded
local governments' control over the use of federal housing funds by providing block grants
under the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. Professor Nolon ar-
gues that because of the 1974 Act, these funds were used less frequently for functions, and
therefore, less control was exercised over housing providers. See Nolon, supra note 63, at
255-56.
76. Spending authority for the new construction program slowly dwindled until its ulti-
mate repeal in 1983. Housing and Urban Rural Recovery Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181,
97 Stat. 1181 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1988)).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1988).
78. Id.; 24 C.F.R. §§ 882.106, 882.105 (1993). The Section 8 Existing Housing Program
is administered by PHAs.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f; 24 C.F.R. §§ 882.106, 882.105.
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vouchers do not correspond to any specific unit.8"
3. Subsidized Housing
Beginning in the early 1960s and continuing through the 1970s, federal
housing efforts focused on two programs within the context of subsidized
housing. Under the first, the federal government provided capital subsi-
dies for housing construction for the elderly and handicapped.81 Under
the second, the federal government provided low-interest mortgage loans
to private housing developers, who were required to offer housing to low-
income families at a rate below the market rental rate.82
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f.
81. See Housing Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-372, § 202, 73 Stat. 654, 667 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1701q (1988)).
82. Under section 221(d)(3) of the Housing Act of 1954, ch. 649, 68 Stat. 590, 601, the
Below Market Interest Rate Program (BMIR) provided subsidies in the form of low-inter-
est mortgage loans to private housing developers. Savings were to be passed to lower-
income tenants. 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(2) (1988). Eligible participants included private non-
profit sponsors, public sponsors, limited dividend corporations, and cooperatives. 12
U.S.C. 17151(d)(3) (1988). Regulations require eligible housing projects for nonprofit
sponsors to consist of 10 or more units that were either "detached, semi-detached, or row
houses, or multi-family structures." 24 C.F.R. § 221.545(b)(1) (1970). Once the mortgage
was paid in full, the property owner could withdraw from the program and be released
from the affordability restrictions. § 221(e), 68 Stat. at 601. The program was phased out
in 1968. At that time, the total number of units in the program represented only one
percent of the total volume of private construction. See Hays, supra note 64, at 188; Randi
L. Engel, Comment, Critical Housing Needs and the Emergency Low Income Housing
Preservation Act of 1987: A Short-Term Solution to a Long-Term Problem, 40 EMORY L.J.
163, 169-72 (1991).
The Section 236 Program replaced the Section 221(d)(3) Program. Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 201(a), 82 Stat. 476, 498. Under this
section, Congress provided funding for federal mortgage insurance and subsidized interest
payments to lenders. Id. at 498-99. Nonprofit organizations, limited-dividend sponsors,
and cooperatives remained eligible participants. Eligible housing projects for all partici-
pants were required to consist of five or more units that were either "detached, semide-
tached, or row construction" and offered at affordable rental rates. See Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 201(a), 90 Stat. 476, 498. The
program allowed owners to prepay their mortgages in full after 20 years, withdraw from
the program after such prepayment, and be released from affordability and use restrictions.
Section 236 was eliminated during the 1973 Nixon moratorium on subsidized housing pro-
grams. At that time, 142,000 units had been constructed with section 236 funding and more
than one-half million units had been issued section 236 financing or contract authority.
The Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987 was enacted "(1) to
preserve and retain to the maximum extent practicable as housing affordable to low in-
come families or persons those privately owned dwelling units that were produced for such
purpose with Federal assistance; [and] (2) to minimize the involuntary displacement of
tenants currently residing in such housing." Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 202(b)(1)-(2), 101 Stat.
1877, 1878 (1988) (superseded in the general revision of the Emergency Low Income
Housing Preservation Act of 1987 by Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 601(a), 104 Stat. 4249 (1990)).
The Act placed conditions on a property owner's right to prepay her mortgage and with-
draw from other requirements of the program, including the lower income affordability
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4. Demand-Side Subsidies
During the 1980s, political and ideological trends caused a shift in the
focus of federal housing efforts toward demand-side subsidies. Demand-
side subsidies, such as mortgage insurance 83 and tax benefits,84 are pro-
grams intended to benefit all persons, regardless of income level or need.
Specifically, these subsidies include measures designed for "lower income
families," defined by law as "families whose incomes do not exceed 80
per centum of the median income for the area." 85
and use restrictions. Id. § 221. The Act was replaced by the Low Income Housing Preser-
vation and Resident Homeownership Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 601(a), 104 Stat.
4249 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4101 et seq. (Supp. V 1993)). Among other things, the Act
offered fair market value incentives to private owners to continue to use their property as
low-income housing projects but retained restrictions on prepayment of mortgages. Id.
83. The FHA program, under the National Housing Act, along with the Veterans Ad-
ministration (VA), under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, provide private
loans for housing. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750g (1988). The FHA mortgage insurance program
covers low-equity loans, sets interest rate ceilings, and establishes uniform lending criteria.
The program was instrumental in originating and standardizing the long-term self-amortiz-
ing fixed-rate mortgage, thus increasing the potential market for mortgages and the possi-
bility of homeownership. Lily M. Hoffman & Barbara S. Heisler, Home Finance: Buying
and Keeping a House in a Changing Financial Environment, in HANDBOOK OF HOUSING,
supra note 4, at 149, 152.
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-1723h
(1988), and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1451-1459 (1988), also purchase loans made by private lenders. Hoffman & Heisler,
supra, at 152-53. Fannie Mae was originally intended to draw more funds into the residen-
tial housing market, to redistribute these funds regionally, and to insulate housing markets
from monetary and fiscal policy. Id. In the secondary market, "'lenders can sell or trade
the loans they originate, thus lowering their risk while allowing them to retain fees for
continuing to service the loans.' " Id. (citation omitted). Freddie Mac was established in
1970 as a subsidiary to the Federal Home Loan Bank system to establish a pass-through
program for conventional mortgages. Id. at 153.
The government purchases mortgages made by private lenders through the Government
National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae). 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-1723h (1988). Ginnie
Mae buys and packages FHAIVA-insured mortgages and sells them directly to investors,
creating a pass-through by guaranteeing principal and interest to the ultimate investor, and
servicing fees to the originator. Id. § 1721(g); see Charles L. Edson, Public Assistance for
Housing-Past, Present, and Future, 3 PuB. L. F. 77 (1983) (discussing the role of the gov-
ernment as a purchaser of mortgages made by private lenders).
84. The tax benefits include: a deduction for home mortgage interest and real prop-
erty taxes, I.R.C. §§ 163, 164 (1988), the deferral of capital gains tax upon the sale of one
principal residence house and purchase of another within two years, id. § 1034, and the
nonrecognition of capital gain upon the sale of a home by persons over the age of 55. Id.
§ 121.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(2) (1988). In general, occupancy of public housing is limited
to "lower income families." Id. The class of lower income families is divided into two
subclasses: low income families, whose incomes are from 80% to 50% of the median, and
very low income families, whose incomes are below 50% of the median. Id.
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The rent supplements program16 is one example of the demand-side
approach.87 Under this program, the government makes rent payments
on behalf of low-income families, enabling them to occupy housing units
built by private nonprofit or limited dividend corporations. 8 These units
are financed by FHA-insured mortgages bearing interest at the market
rate. The rent supplement payment is determined by the amount neces-
sary for the eligible family to fulfill its rental obligations, an amount that
exceeds thirty percent of the family's income.8 9 The program was
designed to provide decent housing for low-income families while stimu-
lating private sector housing investment in urban areas. 9° Although still
in existence, the rent supplement program remains small, restricted to
renters of units in housing projects that already receive federal mortgage
subsidies under other federal programs.91
B. Experiment with Cash Housing Allowances
In 1970, Congress authorized an experimental housing allowance pro-
gram (EHAP), a form of demand-side subsidy.92 The program provided
cash payments to low-income families for the purpose of securing rental
housing in the private market.93 While the theory of direct subsidies pro-
86. Pub. L. No. 89-117, § 101(a), 79 Stat. 451 (1965) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1701s (1988)).
87. The Section 23 Leasing Program is another demand-side program through which
local housing agencies lease privately owned and managed dwelling units, which are then
subleased to low-income families at a subsidized rental charge. Housing and Urban Devel-
opment Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, § 103(a), 79 Stat. 451, 455 (amending the United
States Housing Act of 1937 which was superseded in the 1974 general revision of the Act
by Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974)). This program was phased out by the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 653.
88. 12 U.S.C. § 1701s (1988).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-609 § 504(a), 84
Stat. 1770, 1786.
93. During the period from January 1971 through March 1972, HUD worked with the
Urban Institute to design and implement an EHAP. Frieden, supra note 65, at 237. The
experiment began in 1973 and ended in 1980, involved more than 25,000 families in 12
cities, and cost over $160 million. Id. The program was open to individual elderly and
handicapped persons and families of two or more people. Id. at 238. It set income eligibil-
ity standards, taking the local cost of adequate housing and the size of the household into
account. Id. The maximum income limit for a family of four was less than $7000. Id. The
housing allowance payments were equivalent to the difference between the estimated cost
of adequate housing and 25% of the family's income. Id. Payments averaged $75 per
month. Id. The program permitted families to spend more or less than the estimated cost
of housing, so long as the housing met minimum quality standards set by the experiment.
Id.
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viding for basic human needs generally prevails in our welfare system, in
the case of housing, this demand-side strategy failed.
The EHAP had three components: the demand experiment, the supply
experiment, and the administrative agency experiment.94 The demand
experiment analyzed the degree of satisfaction among families who par-
ticipated in the experiment.95 It examined the choices families made with
respect to the quality and location of their housing and the degree of their
satisfaction with these choices. 96 The supply experiment tested the effects
of cash allowances on the cost and quality of housing, on the behavior of
landlords and realtors, and on the patterns of residential mobility.97 The
administrative agency experiment tested the performance of agencies in
screening and enrolling applicants, certifying eligibility, providing coun-
seling, and making household inspections.9"
In the demand experiment, researchers found that less than half of the
eligible families actually participated in the program.99 Cash allowances
were shown to have little, if any, impact on a family's choice of living
location, the economic or racial concentration in available locations, or
the quality of neighborhoods in which participating families lived."° Re-
searchers discovered that the EHAP experiment did not result in a pro-
94. The demand experiment was conducted in Pittsburgh and Phoenix. Id. at 238.
The supply experiment was conducted in Green Bay, Wisconsin and South Bend, Indiana.
Id. The administrative agency experiment selected eight different agencies in different cit-
ies around the country. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 238-39.
99. Id. at 247. Studies attempted to explain this phenomenon by suggesting that some
people were content with their original choice of living arrangements. Id. Others pro-
posed that some people doubted whether their homes could pass the inspection or whether
the landlord would agree to rent to people in the program. Id. People were concerned
about the stigma associated with the program and possible demeaning treatment by agency
personnel. Id. Moreover, searching for a new home was burdensome, administrative pro-
cedures were overwhelming, and the housing standards set were very high. Id. Further-
more, minority families were less likely than other enrollees to meet the standards for
payment. Hartman, supra note 15, at 370.
100. Bendick & Struyk, supra note 65, at 107-08. Program participants were generally
reluctant to move. Frieden, supra note 65, at 245. A sizable portion of the participating
families, however, did move: 45% in the administrative experiment cities, 39% in the de-
mand experiment cities, and 16% in the supply experiment cities. Id. Although the re-
corded information was "scattered," it showed that people who moved tended to enter
better neighborhoods. Id. at 245-46. Generally, "most people who moved went into cen-
sus tracts with a higher socioeconomic index rating (based on resident income, education,
and employment) than the places they left. Of black households who moved, 30 percent
moved to areas with lower minority concentrations than their original neighborhoods." Id.
at 246. The program, however, did not present significant opportunities to poor families
living in suburban areas. Id.
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portional increase in the overall satisfaction with the housing experience,
including the location and quality of housing.1"1 Furthermore, in at least
half the cases, the cash allowances failed to reduce the rent payment to an
amount within twenty-five percent of the family's income. 0 2
In the supply experiment, researchers found no substantial expansion
or improvement in the quality of housing stock, 10 3 or in the overall condi-
tion of cities. Nor did the experiment result in any major increases in
freedom of choice in housing.' °4
C. Efficacy of the Forms of Assistance
A comparison of housing programs in the first three categories (public
housing, Section 8 Existing Housing, and subsidized housing) with those
in the fourth group (demand-side subsidies) reveals that the former have
a greater impact on housing supply and quality. The value of Section 8
Existing Housing Program certificates, however, is limited by the willing-
ness of private landowners to enter into contracts with local PHAs.1°5
101. Frieden, supra note 65, at 248. Under the program, "a 10 percent increase in in-
come for renters led to only a 1.9 percent increase in rent payments." Id. Moreover, the
majority of the housing allowance was used to obtain goods and services, with only 25% of
the allowance used to obtain better housing. Hartman, supra note 15, at 370.
102. Frieden, supra note 65, at 243.
103. The experiment produced virtually no effect on housing costs, either increases or
decreases, nor did it stimulate new construction or rehabilitation (beyond minor repairs).
Id. at 248-49; Hartman, supra note 15, at 371. Repairs that were undertaken were ex-
tremely modest in scope. Bendick & Struyk, supra note 65, at 187; Frieden, supra note 65,
at 244. Windows were fixed and handrails were installed on stairs. Id. Some work, how-
ever, was done on certain structural components, such as plumbing and heating systems.
Id. at 244-45. "Three out of four below-standard dwellings were brought up to an accepta-
ble level at cash costs of less than $25 in Green Bay and less than $30 in South Bend." Id.
at 245.
104. Frieden, supra note 65, at 245. In general, the Program V Report drew similar but
somewhat more positive conclusions.
Public housing units had only slightly lower value than the housing units occu-
pied by voucher recipients in Pittsburgh and Phoenix when value is expressed as
an estimated rent. Public housing was less likely than private market housing to
have physical deficiencies relating to health and safety of occupants, but public
housing tenants were also less likely to express satisfaction with their units and,
especially, with their neighborhoods.
The offer of a voucher to public housing tenants in South Bend resulted in, at
most, a slight increase in public housing vacancies and a slight decrease in the size
of the public housing waiting list.
PROGRAM V, supra note 6, at 325.
105. The New York Times recently reported on the success of the "Underground Rail-
road" in Chicago. Jason DeParle, An Underground Railroad From Projects to Suburbs,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1993, at Al. This "Underground Railroad" is a national program that
provides inner-city families Section 8 certificates to move to the suburbs. Id.
A large percentage of minority households and families with children were unable to use
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The program has an even smaller impact on the housing market when
there are relatively few certificates available. °6
While the goal of demand-side subsidies is to increase the demand for
housing, thereby increasing supply as the market responds, the EHAP
experiment showed that, in fact, such subsidies have no significant effect
on the housing construction industry. Moreover, subsidies do not neces-
sarily increase the supply of affordable housing or improve the quality of
existing housing. Instead, the experiment demonstrated that cash al-
lowances became income supplements for low-income families already
living in good housing. Conversely, if a family did not live in good hous-
ing, it was unlikely that the family would be able to take advantage of the
program either by moving to better housing or by inducing the property
owner to upgrade the physical condition of their current housing. 10 7 Fur-
thermore, racial and class discrimination, combined with housing
shortages, continued to prevent low-income families from moving into
better, more integrated neighborhoods, offsetting the real value of cash
allowances.' 08 As the EHAP experiment apparently illustrates, demand-
side subsidies often benefit those least in need-builders, lenders, mid-
dle-class homeowners, and low-income families at the upper end of the
eligibility range.'0 9
III. REVOLUTION IN PRIVATE LEASE LAW
A tenant's ability to pay market rent through the receipt of a demand-
side subsidy does not directly alter the behavior of private builders and
landowners in improving the quantity and quality of available housing.
Instead, a tenant must rely upon the various principles of private lease
their Section 8 Existing Housing certificates. Hartman, supra note 15, at 372. The Presi-
dent's Commission on Housing reported that large families, single-parent households, and
minority families are less likely to participate in the Section 8 Existing Housing Program.
THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING 26-27 (1982).
106. During the previous two presidential administrations, HUD's budget for public
housing was cut by two-thirds. As a result, there was no new authority for housing assist-
ance in 1986. In 1987, budget authority existed for only 50,000 housing vouchers, while in
1988, such authority existed for only 79,000 vouchers. By 1988, HUD's budget provided
for only 3000 units of new construction subsidy. See Lowry, supra note 15, at 94.
107. See Hartman, supra note 15, at 372.
108. See MARC BENDICK, JR. & JAMES P. ZAIS, INCOMES AND HOUSING: LESSONS
FROM EXPERIMENTS WITH HOUSING ALLOWANCES 2 (Urban Institute ed., 1978).
109. These demand-side subsidies also can be criticized because they offered families
little choice in deciding where to live. To receive the benefit of the subsidy, eligible fami-
lies had to move to a development of a government selected sponsor. Frieden, supra note
65, at 240. As a result, "allocation of subsidized housing to communities across the country
did not correspond as much to the needs of low-income residents as it did to the energy,
activity, and political muscle of local sponsors." Id.
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law to achieve these ends. Two private lease law principles that have his-
torically barred low-income families from access to safe, decent, and af-
fordable housing are still in existence. These are the "no-repair" rule and
the "termination or nonrenewal without cause" rule. The no-repair rule
emerged from the common law concept of the lease as a conveyance,
through which the tenant received an estate in the premises. The natural
conclusion under this legal framework is that, absent an express agree-
ment to the contrary, the landlord is not concerned with the condition of
the premises. 110 The termination or nonrenewal without cause rule in-
volves an aspect of the duration of occupancy provisions most commonly
used in urban leases-the tenancy for years"' and the periodic ten-
ancy.' 2 Under both, the tenant receives the right to exclusive possession
of the property for a stated period of time (the term or period). In a
tenancy for years, the landlord is entitled to resume possession of the
property at the end of the stated term. In a periodic tenancy, the landlord
may resume possession at the end of the period only after notifying the
tenant.' 1
3
110. See infra notes 150-72 and accompanying text.
111. The tenancy for years first appeared in England at the end of the 12th century.
William M. McGovern, The Historical Conception of a Lease for Years, 23 UCLA L. REV.
501, 501 (1976). Initially, the tenancy for years was not regarded as a freehold, a posses-
sory interest in land, but rather as a chattel. Id. at 526-27. As such, the tenant for years
had only a personal claim against the lessor and could not sue third parties for injury to the
land or for disseisin. Id. at 505-06. The tenancy for years became common only later in
the Middle Ages when many of the ideas associated with "feudalism" had disappeared. Id.
at 504. By that time, tenants acquired better remedies, such as the action in ejectment,
than those given to freeholders. Id. at 520, 526 (citing A.W.B. SIMPSON, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 136 (1961)). Based on the availability of the
remedy of ejectment, the tenant for years was considered to have an interest in real prop-
erty, the result of a conveyance, but only during the term. Id. at 527-28.
112. In a periodic tenancy, the landlord-tenant relationship begins with a fixed period
and continues by successive like periods until the tenancy is terminated. See CORNELIUS J.
MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 65 (2d ed. 1988).
113. Either party is free to terminate a periodic tenancy at the end of a period. Id. at
66. Termination, however, requires notice. At common law, the required notice for a ten-
ancy from year to year was six months. Id. at 65. For shorter lease periods, the required
notice was equal to the term of the lease. Currently, most statutes require only 30 days
notice. A tenancy for years ends upon its terms and does not require notice for termina-
tion. Id. at 58. Where a tenant remains in possession after the expiration of a tenancy for
years, an implied periodic tenancy is created in many jurisdictions. Id. at 67. For a com-
plete discussion of the periodic tenancy and the tenancy for years, see generally CHARLES
DONAHUE, JR. ET AL., PROPERTY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITU-
TION 435, 676-80 (3d ed. 1993) (periodic tenancy and holdover tenants); THEODORE F.T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 570-74 (5th ed. 1956) (tenancy
for years); ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT §§ 2:10
to :15 (1980 & Supp. 1994) (periodic tenancy); A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND
LAW 235-37 (2d ed. 1986) (periodic tenancy).
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Recent doctrinal changes, to some degree, have disturbed the tradi-
tional principles of private lease law. As a result, new burdens have been
imposed on the landlord, such that "[tienants' rights have increased dra-
matically; landlords' rights have decreased dramatically., 114 These doc-
trinal changes, particularly as they developed from Supreme Court
decisions interpreting New Deal legislation, reflect the overall jurispru-
dential transition from classical to neo-classical legal thought. Prior to
the New Deal era, the majority of the Court expansively read the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause while narrowly construing Con-
gress' commerce and taxing power. These judicial philosophies limited
the range of governmental involvement in private economic decisionmak-
ing,115 threatening those New Deal programs that proposed to expand
the existing scope of congressional, presidential, or federal administrative
authority. 1 6 In the mid-1930s, however, the Supreme Court abruptly
narrowed its views on substantive due process and freedom of contract,
thus permitting greater governmental intervention in private com-
merce.1 7 New Deal programs such as social security and public housing
114. Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes
and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 519 (1984). See generally Symposium, The
Revolution in Residential Landlord Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L.
REV. 517 (1984) (tracing the development of landlord and tenant rights).
115. Parrish, supra note 27, at 728-29. Parrish's work provides an insightful review of
the constitutional revolution that took place in the 1930s. In significant rulings, the
Supreme Court struck down state and federal laws attempting to alter the existing legal
order. Id. Such laws prescribed minimum standards for employment and attempted to
regulate manufacturing. Id. at 728.
116. Id. at 730-31. The Court invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act and the
Frazier-Lemke Farm Relief Act and sought to require President Roosevelt to obtain the
specific approval of Congress before using his power to remove members of independent
regulatory commissions. Id. at 731; see LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 37, at 231-74 (discuss-
ing judicial restriction of New Deal programs).
117. See generally KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN His-
TORY (1989) (reviewing the Supreme Court's policy reversal during the New Deal era).
Many theories attempt to explain the Supreme Court's apparent reversal. Parrish con-
tends that the reversal could have resulted from "the fact that statutes were more carefully
drafted as the emergency of the Hundred Days passed and as the administration recruited
more experienced legislative draftsmen." Parrish, supra note 27, at 732. Alternatively, he
suggests that the Court did not reverse its position at all, but rather, "before and after 1937
the justices engaged in scrupulous line-drawing between acceptable and unacceptable regu-
latory schemes." Id. Parrish writes:
In the final analysis, both the impasse and its solution were more political than
doctrinal. [Justices] Hughes and Roberts, both moderate Republicans, looked
upon many of the New Deal's reforms and some state level programs as radical,
especially with respect to the redistribution of social and economic power.
Other old progressives ... fought the New Deal for these same reasons after
1935. By joining with the conservative justices in 1935-36, Hughes and Roberts
hoped to portray FDR and his advisers as dangerous subversives who were tam-
pering with constitutional verities.... Faced with a choice between an administra-
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reflected this shift. As these new entitlements became embodied in fed-
eral legislation, the receipt of assistance to meet basic human needs be-
came viewed not as a matter of charity, but of right."'
The new rights created by New Deal programs triggered the develop-
ment of new legal theories. These new theories affected existing common
law theories, as courts were increasingly asked to construe statutes and
regulations to decide issues once governed exclusively by common law
rules.119 In contract law (from which private lease law borrowed heav-
ily), legislation and regulation removed some contract matters, such as
insurance, labor, wages, product pricing and standards, from the free
market altogether. Consequently, there was a decided shift from private
to public regulation of economic decisionmaking. Contrary to the pre-
Depression classical period, "public policy" became as significant a factor
in interpreting contracts as the parties' private bargain itself. The neo-
classical notion of unconscionability circumscribed the range of judicially
enforceable private agreements, narrowing a party's ability to limit or dis-
claim liability to within the bounds of public concern. 120 Consequently,
tion that had arrested the economic decline and a group of Justices who argued
that this administration often behaved unconstitutionally, the voters placed their
immediate self-interest above abstract lawyers' arguments. Roosevelt's landslide
[in 1936] left Hughes and Roberts with no alternative but capitulation.
Id. at 733-34.
Other aspects of the Court's work during the decade had profound and lasting signifi-
cance, including civil liberties and civil rights decisions, federal habeas corpus relief, and
the expansion of the in forma pauperis docket. Id. at 734-35.
118. These new-found "rights" have never achieved the same status as those originating
in the common law. Instead, they are qualified as "entitlements." The array of claims that
Americans assert against the government, however, is quite diverse, leading to a descrip-
tion of American society as
built around entitlement. The automobile dealer has his franchise, the doctor and
lawyer their professional licenses, the worker his union membership, contract,
and pension rights, the executive his contract and stock options; all are devices to
aid security and independence. Many of the most important of these entitlements
now flow from government: subsidies to farmers and businessmen, routes for air-
lines and channels for television stations; long term contracts for defense, space,
and education; social security pensions for individuals. Such sources of security,
whether private or public, are no longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the
recipients they are essentials, fully deserved, and in no sense a form of charity. It
is only the poor whose entitlements, although recognized by public policy, have
not been effectively enforced.
Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74
YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965), quoted in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970); see
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (examining the growth of
government entitlement programs).
119. See HALL, supra note 117, at 292-95.
120. For a discussion of the movement of law away from the late-nineteenth century
faith in objectivity and formalism, see HALL, supra note 117, at 297. Unconscionability as
a bar to enforceability has been incorporated into the Uniform Commercial Code at § 2-
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caveat emptor, to some extent, was eclipsed by new concerns of fairness
and efficiency. 2'
A. Reasons for the Revolution in Private Lease Law
The transition in private lease law reached its greatest momentum in
the 1960s. Professor Rabin offers four reasons for the pace and nature of
the "revolutionary" transition.' 22 First, he explains that "some of the
more well-known changes [in private lease law] strike at the core of the
landlord-tenant relationship, both in legal and practical terms.' ' 123 These
include limitations on the landlord's right to determine the amount of
rent, to gain possession when the term ends, and to select tenants, in ad-
dition to limitations on the parties' right to decide the extent of landlord
services. 124 Second, Rabin states that "both courts and legislatures have
significantly participated in the revolution."' 25 Third, Rabin explains that
the doctrinal changes have been rapid, with the most significant move-
ment occurring between 1968 and 1973.126 Finally, and what Rabin refers
to as the "most important" reason, "almost all of the changes have fa-
vored the tenant as against the landlord.' '127 Specifically, these doctrinal
changes have produced and influenced the development of an implied
warranty of habitability, rent control legislation, an expansion of the
landlord's tort liability, antidiscrimination laws, limitations on the land-
lord's right to evict, and limitations on the landlord's right of self-help.' 28
Professor Rabin argues that the civil rights movement was the motivat-
ing factor behind this transformation because it "created a climate of ac-
tivism that demanded prompt, dramatic changes."' 29 Another factor he
recognizes is the resistance to the Vietnam War and the influence of the
antiwar protestors' victory over the "establishment" on the American
political atmosphere.13' Rabin also identifies institutional and legal
302. U.C.C. § 2-302, 1A U.L.A. 15-16 (1989). See U.C.C. §§ 2-316(1) and 2-316(2), 1A
U.L.A. 465 (1989) for limitations on disclaimers.
121. Notwithstanding the proclamation of "The Death of Contract" in 1974, contracts
continue to sustain important social and economic relationships though limited by new
concepts. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 5 (1974).
122. Rabin, supra note 114, at 521.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See infra notes 150-213 and accompanying text.
129. Rabin, supra note 114, at 546-47; see Glendon, supra note 25, at 511 (giving some
credit for private lease law developments to legal services organizations challenging the old
regime).
130. Rabin, supra note 114, at 550.
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changes that affected landlord tenant relations. In particular, he high-
lights reapportionment, which realigned state legislatures to reflect urban
constituencies, therefore bringing urban grievances to the public atten-
tion.13 Developments in legal theory, precedents, and legislation that
provided tenants with enforceable rights as to the condition of the prem-
ises were also significant. 132 Finally, Professor Rabin cites the economic
basis for the transformation. He states that the economic health of the
nation during this era "made it seem feasible to launch and win a 'war
against poverty'. . . . Judges and legislators believed that landlords could
afford to give up some of their profits for the benefit of slum dwellers
because the landlord's economic position, like that of everyone else, was
improving."1 33
Professor Friedman does not agree that a "revolution" in private lease
law occurred. 134 Rather, he suggests that the change developed because
the modern "modal fact situations" differ significantly from the older
cases that formed the basis of private lease law. 135 Professor Friedman
notes that until the 1960s, there were few contemporary-style apartment
buildings, and thus, little case law concerning them.136 Consequently, the
law that did exist applied loosely to contemporary residential and com-
mercial property leases.1 37 "Impressions about the 'revolution' in land-
lord-tenant law," Professor Friedman contends, "are reinforced by
looking at parallel changes in other fields of law.' '1 38
In an important work that preceded Professor Rabin's article, Profes-
131. Id. at 550-51.
132. Id. at 551-53.
133. Id. at 554.
134. Lawrence M. Friedman, Comments on Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Resi-
dential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 585, 585
(1984).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 586. He states that "none of the earlier cases involved slum poverty." Id. at
585.
137. Id. at 586. For example, the remedy of distraint would apply more appropriately
in an agricultural community; it could permit a landlord to enter the land and gather crops
and livestock. Id. It would be viewed quite differently if it permitted a landlord to enter
an apartment and "start rummaging around in the drawers and closets for jewelry and
furs." Id. Professor Friedman rejects the notion that the greatest impetus for the private
lease law movement was concern over slum housing and problems of dilapidation, human
suffering, and violations of housing codes. Id. Instead, he argues that wealthy tenants,
who did not receive what they thought they contracted for from their landlords, influenced
the law. Id. at 586-87. He suggests "that the trend Professor Rabin describes is largely
independent of class and political ideology. Otherwise, why would the new rules be so
uncommonly infectious?" Id. at 587.
138. Id. at 588. For other comments on the doctrinal changes occurring in private lease
law, see Charles Donahue, Jr., Change in the American Law of Landlord and Tenant, 37
MOD. L. REV. 242 (1974). See also Cunningham, supra note 23.
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sor Glendon argues that the so-called "revolution" in private lease law
"appears, in historical perspective, to have been no more or less than the
culmination, in one area of the law, of certain long-standing trends that
have transformed not only landlord-tenant law, but private law generally
over the past century." '139 This was a trend away from private ordering
and toward public regulation."4 While property law never completely
encompassed lease law, by the turn of the century, and up to the 1960s,
lease law employed real and personal property principles as well as some
contract notions.'41 Over the course of the twentieth century, lease law
principles began to reflect modern contract, tort, civil procedure, and
commercial law.' 42 According to Glendon, "[t]he decisive element in the
transformation of the residential landlord-tenant relationship has been its
subjection to pervasive, mostly statutory, regulation of its incidents."' 43
B. Rejection of the "No-Repair" Rule
One of the significant doctrinal changes in private lease law was the
reconceptualization of the lease. Many courts declared that a lease, to
some extent, is both an estate in land and a contract. This enabled courts
to ameliorate the seeming harshness of private lease law by applying the
new "public policy" gloss of contract law.'" Contract doctrine permitted
courts to recognize the dependence of covenants and to demand mutual-
ity of obligation and remedies between landlords and tenants. 45 There-
fore, the tenant could raise the lessor's failure to perform a covenant or
promise as a basis for withholding the payment of rent while still remain-
139. Glendon, supra note 25, at 504.
140. Id. at 505, 575-76.
141. Id. at 504.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 504-05.
144. See id. at 575-76; see also Humbach, supra note 32, at 1215-17 (contending that an
application of traditional contract principles to leases may prove to be an obstacle to re-
form of landlord-tenant law). Humbach notes that courts treat leases and ordinary con-
tracts differently. Id. at 1215. In fact, reformists may be better served by traditional
conceptions, rather than ordinary contract law. Id. at 1215, 1288. Humbach argues that
"[riesort to a contract theory of leasing can be criticized for its flawed understanding of
contract law and for its nonrecognition of certain factual realities and interpretational con-
sequences which would rationalize results under the conveyance approach." Id. at 1288.
As Humbach explains, the common law courts' choice of the conveyance theory was
thought to better protect the tenant's possession under the common law system. Id.; see
Subcommittee on the Model Landlord-Tenant Act of Committee on Leases, Proposed
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 8 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 104, 105
(1973) (suggesting that residential lease arrangement should be founded in contract law).
145. See Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202,208 (Vt. 1984); Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d
409, 413 (Wis. 1961); Humbach, supra note 32, at 1215-17.
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ing in possession.' 46 The tenant could assert the same defense in a sum-
mary proceeding brought by the landlord to recover possession. 147
Moreover, contract doctrine enabled courts to imply lease terms148 and to
refuse to enforce terms that were found unconscionable. 49
Perhaps the most significant implied term is the implied warranty of
habitability as discussed in Javins v. First National Realty Corp. 5 In
Javins, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit rejected the common law no-repair rule and held that, in the con-
text of an urban residential lease, tenants have the benefit of an implied
warranty of the landlord to maintain the premises in a state that is fit for
human habitation.15' The court explained that "the common law itself
must recognize the landlord's obligation to keep his premises in a habita-
ble condition.' 52 The court offered three reasons for its decision. First,
the court noted that the no-repair rule was based on factual assumptions
that are not applicable to the modern residential lease. 53 The rule arose
in an agrarian economy where the land itself was the essence of the land-
lord-tenant relationship, and the tenant farmer was capable of making his
own repairs. 154 This stands in marked contrast to the modern, urban
apartment dweller's lease that has value because it gives the tenant a
place to live. 155 Furthermore, given the increased structural complexity
146. See Berzito v. Gambino, 308 A.2d 17, 21 (N.J. 1973); P.H. Inv. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d
1018, 1020 (Utah 1991); Hilder, 478 A.2d at 209-10. But see Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56 (1972) (holding that a statute that precluded a tenant from raising the landlord's failure
to maintain the leased premises as a defense in a summary eviction proceeding did not
violate due process). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD
AND TENANT § 7.1 (1977) (discussing the remedies available to a tenant when a landlord
fails to perform a promise contained in a lease).
147. See, e.g., Berzito, 308 A.2d at 21-22.
148. See UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 1.303, 7B U.L.A. 44
(1985).
149. See id.
150. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
151. Id. at 1078-79. In fact, a number of court decisions foreshadowed Javins. In Dela-
mater v. Foreman, 239 N.W. 148 (Minn. 1931), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the
old common law rules had to be adapted to the circumstances of modern apartment build-
ings. Id. at 148-49. In the modern context, the landlord should be held to an implied
covenant that guarantees the habitability of the premises. Id. However, a court did not
make a similar ruling for another 30 years. In Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409 (Wis.
1961), the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that there was an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity in a one-year residential lease and that the covenants to pay rent and to provide a
habitable house were mutually dependent. Id. at 413.
152. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1077.
153. Id. at 1074.
154. Id.
155. Id. When "city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek 'shelter' today, they seek a well
known package of goods and services-a package which includes not merely walls and
ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, se-
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156of buildings, it is difficult for the typical tenant to make repairs.
Second, the court reasoned that the no-repair rule had to be aban-
doned in order to bring residential landlord-tenant law into harmony with
emerging principles in consumer protection and contract law.'57 In inter-
preting most contracts, courts sought to protect the legitimate expecta-
tions of the buyer by steadily broadening the seller's responsibility for the
quality of goods and services through implied warranties of quality.' 58
Based on these same theories, courts began to hold sellers and developers
of real property responsible for the quality of the residential unit. Thus, a
tenant may rely on the expectation that his apartment will be habitable
for the term of the lease, just as a purchaser of goods or services and a
consumer renter may rely on the honesty of the supplier's assurance that
the goods are of merchantable quality.'59
Third, the Javins court explained that the nature of the modern urban
housing market dictated the abandonment of the old rule. It noted that
housing codes regulate certain aspects of the housing market, specifically
those pertaining to conditions affecting the health and well-being of the
community.' 60 The court noted that "the social impact of bad housing
had led to the realization that poor housing is detrimental to the whole
society."161 Moreover, it found that housing codes required an implied
warranty, given their purpose of keeping premises sanitary and safe and
the socio-political policy of imposing the duty to repair on a property
owner.
162
The warranty of habitability requires a landlord to deliver and maintain
premises in a condition that is fit for human habitation. It applies to de-
fects existing at the commencement of the lease term as well as those
arising thereafter. 163 The landlord has a continuing duty or covenant to
cure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance." Id. (footnote
omitted).
156. Id. at 1077-78.
157. Id. at 1078-79.
158. Id. at 1078-80.
159. Id. at 1079.
160. Id. at 1080.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 1080; see also Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 206-07 (Vt. 1984) (dis-
cussing the theory of the implied warranty). Prior to Javins, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals ruled that renting premises which, at the inception of the lease, fail to
meet housing code requirements is illegal, making the lease unenforceable. See Brown v.
Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834, 837 (D.C. 1968).
163. Later, some courts and statutes extended the warranty to single-family residences
and to units not subject to a housing or building code. See Glasoe v. Trinkle, 479 N.E.2d
915, 918 (II. 1985); Hilder, 478 A.2d at 202.
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repair."6 In most jurisdictions, a tenant does not assume the risk if she
enters into a lease agreement with knowledge of a defect, 165 nor can the
warranty be waived by the tenant or disclaimed by a landlord through a
written provision in the lease or an oral agreement. 16 6 In other jurisdic-
tions, the warranty cannot be waived as to housing code violations. 167
Most states have enacted statutes codifying a warranty of habitabil-
ity. 168 These statutes provide a number of remedies to enforce the war-
ranty, including rescission of the lease agreement, rent withholding, rent
abatement, right to repair and deduct costs from rent, and injunctive re-
lief or specific performance. 69 Through these statutes, tenants who as-
sert the warranty are protected from retaliatory action by the landlord,
164. See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973); Park West
Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 391 N.E.2d 1288 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979);
Hilder, 478 A.2d at 202. See generally Cunningham, supra note 23, at 59-69 (outlining
legislation creating a warranty of habitability).
165. E.g., Hilder, 478 A.2d at 208.
166. Id.; see, e.g., Moity v. Guillory, 430 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied
437 So. 2d 1148 (La. 1983); Boston Hous. Auth., 293 N.E.2d at 831; Fair v. Negley, 390 A.2d
240, 242 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 130-31 (W. Va. 1978). The
New York statute provides that "[any agreement by a tenant of a dwelling waiving or
modifying his rights ... shall be void as contrary to public policy." N.Y. MULT. DWELL.
LAW § 302-c(9) (McKinney Supp. 1994). See generally 2 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL
ON REAL PROPERTY I 233[2][d] (Patrick J. Rohan ed., 1994) (discussing waiver and dis-
claimer of the implied warranty of habitability).
Courts allowing waiver of the warranty of habitability cite the need to protect the expec-
tations of the parties and their freedom to contract. See, e.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d
791, 796-97 (Iowa 1972); Kline v. Burns, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (N.H. 1971); Berzito v. Gam-
bino, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (N.J. 1973); Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658, 660 n.2 (Tex.
1978); Garza-Vale v. Kwiecien, 796 S.W.2d 500, 502-03 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); P.H. Inv. v.
Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1021-22 (Utah 1991). Section 2.104(c) of the Uniform Residential
Landlord Tenant Act seems to support a waiver to the extent that it provides for written
agreements that shift some of the landlord's statutory duties to the tenant. UNIF. RESIDEN-
TIAL LANDLORD TENANT ACT § 2.104(c), 7B U.L.A. 260 (1985). In jurisdictions that per-
mit waivers, courts tend to construe them narrowly and require that they be express and in
writing. For example, a court may limit waiver coverage to the specific listed defects. See,
e.g., P.H. Inv., 818 P.2d at 1018.
167. See, e.g., Boston Hous. Auth., 293 N.E.2d at 831. See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD AND TENANT §§ 5.1-5.6 (1977) (reviewing parties'
obligations and remedies for unsuitable leased property). The Restatement allows waivers
unless they are unconscionable or significantly against public policy. A waiver of the war-
ranty of habitability may be found to be contrary to public policy if it "will materially and
unreasonably obstruct achievement of a well defined statutory, regulatory, or common law
policy." Id. § 5.6 cmt. e. Furthermore, "[tjhe tenant as a matter of law is unable to waive
any remedies [for breach of the landlord's duty] available to him at the time of entry, if at
the time of entry it would be unsafe or unhealthy to use the leased premises in the manner
contemplated by the parties." Id. § 5.3 cmt. c; see UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND
TENANT ACT § 1.303, 7B U.L.A. 444 (1985).
168. See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 113, at §§ 12.1 to .13.
169. Id.
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such as eviction, increase in rent, change in the lease terms, or
nonrenewal. 7 °
Despite the substantial changes in lease law, commentators argue that
remedies under habitability laws generally fail to improve the welfare of
indigent tenants, and may even have the negative effect of producing a
shrinkage of substandard housing.17  Others argue that the model codes
produced by the revolution (for example, the Uniform Residential Land-
lord-Tenant Act) are "only marginally effective, benefitting primarily
middle-income tenants in the suburbs or in the cities' better neighbor-
hoods, while largely failing in the aim of helping the inner-city poor and
upgrading the quality of slum housing."'172
170. See, e.g., Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
Most states have enacted statutory provisions forbidding retaliation. See ScnOSHIrNSKI,
supra note 113, §§ 12.1 to .13.
171. See Werner Z. Hirsch, From "Food For Thought" to "Empirical Evidence" About
Consequences of Landlord-Tenant Laws, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 604 (1984). In a national
study, Hirsch found that only the remedy of receivership significantly affected demand and
supply regarding low-income tenants. Id. at 606. Statistically, repair/deduct and withhold-
ing laws had no significant effects. Id. The study also considered habitability laws as they
affected two particular classes of indigent tenants-senior citizens and blacks. Id. at 607.
Receivership laws affect both the rental housing supply and demand functions of indigent
elderly tenants equally. Id. In the case of indigent black tenants, however, Hirsch found
that receivership laws affect the supply function much more than the demand function. Id.
As a result, Hirsch concluded that the habitability laws do not aid indigent black tenants to
the same extent as they aid indigent elderly tenants. Id.
Hirsch also studied the effects of habitability laws on the quality of rental housing stock.
Id. at 608. He found that receivership laws significantly affected the shrinkage of substan-
dard housing. Id. at 608. A shrinkage of substandard housing may seem to be a positive
result, but when the withdrawal or abandonment of substandard housing is not replaced
with standard, affordable housing, an increase in absolute homelessness results. Hirsch
concluded that since a strict habitability law, such as receivership, imposed substantial costs
on landlords, landlords were more likely to abide by its provisions. Id. at 609. Conversely,
landlords were less likely to honor the less costly and less compelling repair and deduct
laws. Id. But see Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low-
income Housing: "Milking" and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 485 (1987). Ken-
nedy argued that "enforcement of a nondisclaimable warranty of habitability ... under
particular market and institutional circumstances, benefits low-income tenants at the ex-
pense of their landlords." Id. at 485; see Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Mar-
kets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income
Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L. J. 1093, 1093-95 (1971) (arguing that housing code en-
forcement will not benefit the tenants because landlords will simply pass on the costs);
Richard S. Markovits, The Distributive Impact, Allocative Efficiency, and Overall Desirabil-
ity of Ideal Housing Codes: Some Theoretical Clarifications, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1815 (1976)
(arguing that enforcement of ideal housing codes will benefit low-income housing tenants).
172. Samuel J. Brakel & Donald M. McIntyre, The Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act (URLTA) in Operation: Two Reports, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 555, 559
(1980).
While America's housing quality has steadily improved over the past 40 years, 21.6% of
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Even with the establishment of the warranty of habitability, the con-
tract theory of leases made no significant adjustment in the bargaining
positions of the landlord and tenant with regard to the particular terms of
the lease. Although some limitations were imposed by and rights were
derived from judicially or statutorily implied terms, particular lease provi-
sions, such as consideration (the rent and the term of the tenant's posses-
sion) and conditions and limitations (permissible uses of the property and
liability for utilities and taxes), remained favorable to the landlord. In
sum, the typical residential tenant receives a form lease-a standardized
document offered to all tenants on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, with no ne-
gotiation over terms.1
73
all poor renters (1,417,000 households) in the United States lived in inadequate housing in
1989. STATE OF HOUSING, supra note 4, at 15. The Joint Center for Housing Studies re-
ported that although 77.2% of poor renters directed more than half of their household
incomes towards rents in 1989, 1,417,000 poor renter households lived in structurally inade-
quate housing. Id. at 16. This lack of adequate housing has a greater effect on black and
Hispanic households because these groups have a higher percentage of poor. Id. at 16-17.
Housing assistance programs have upgraded housing conditions for many poor households,
but the rate of growth in the nation's poor has far outpaced the rate of subsidy increase.
Id. at 16. As a result, the number of unassisted poor renters increased from 4.2 million in
1974 to 5.5 million in 1985. Id.
Only a small number of public housing projects (approximately six percent) suffer from
"chronic problems" that would require a per-unit payment of more than $2500 to correct
violations of basic health and safety standards and to bring the building up to minimum
property standards. Bratt, supra note 6 at 345; see PROGRAM V, supra note 6, at 306-26
(reporting that public housing was less likely than private sector housing to have physical
deficiencies relating to health and safety); MEEHAN, supra note 10, at 135-36, 195-96 (criti-
cizing design and construction flaws, including the inadequate number of large units, poor
quality of materials, high density and spare quality); Mary J. Huth, An Examination of
Public Housing in the United States After Forty Years, 8 J. Soc. & Soc. WELFARE 471, 482
(noting that little publicity is "given to many smaller projects, consisting of highly attractive
clusters of one- and two- story townhouses and garden apartments surrounded by lawns,
trees, and playgrounds").
173. See Curtis J. Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 835
(1974). Berger studied 16 standard form leases used in major cities throughout the coun-
try. These leases were typically long (one used in New York City had more than 9000
words). Berger concluded:
The leases almost all treat the residential tenant as a latter-day serf. One sees a
near-pathological concern with tenant duties and landlord remedies, occupying
from 50 to 80 percent of virtually every form. Much of the remaining text seeks
to immunize landlord against the claims of his tenant. One looks vainly for any
recognition of the fact that the tenant may have remedies or the landlord duties.
And only two forms ... begin to suggest the bilateral contract that defines today's
landlord-tenant relationship.
Id.; see Warren Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An Empirical Study, 69
MICH. L. REV. 247 (1970). Mueller's article presents a study of how tenants actually be-
have with regard to their leases. Mueller reports that about half of the tenants surveyed
carefully read their leases, although with widely varying degrees of understanding. Id. at
256. Many tenants regarded conventional provisions, including those favorable to land-
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C. Persistence of "Termination or Nonrenewal Without Cause" Rule
The other common law private lease law rule that operates to deny the
low-income family safe, decent, and affordable housing is the "termina-
tion or nonrenewal without cause" rule. This rule has been left largely
intact by the doctrinal changes of the last three decades. This rule, as it
developed at common law, provides that a property owner is free to re-
fuse to enter into, or to continue, a landlord-tenant relationship for any
or no reason. It is not clear why the transition in private lease law failed
to repudiate this second rule. Perhaps courts and legislatures believed
that repudiation would threaten fundamental principles of individual
freedom-to contract and to enjoy private property. A rejection of this
rule would alter the present form of these freedoms. It is difficult, how-
ever, to see how the consequences of the intrusion would differ signifi-
cantly from the effects of the rejection of the no-repair rule.
The termination or nonrenewal without cause rule would be nullified
by recognition of a right to continued possession beyond the lease term.
Such a right could be characterized as an implied contract right or as an
incident of the property interest in a leasehold. The right to continued
possession beyond the lease term may be an aspect of a fundamental
right to housing based in the Constitution.
1. Constitutional Right to Housing
Establishing a constitutional right to continued possession of a leased
premises beyond the stated term may be foreclosed by the Supreme
Court's ruling in Lindsey v. Normet. 74 In Lindsey, the plaintiffs were
tenants of an apartment declared unfit for habitation due to substandard
conditions. The plaintiffs requested that the landlord make certain re-
pairs, but the landlord refused with one minor exception. 175 The plain-
tiffs then refused to pay rent and the landlord threatened suit.1 76
Thereafter, the plaintiffs commenced an action seeking a declaratory
lords and expressed in fine print, as fair. Id. at 263-64. Few tenants attempted to negotiate
lease terms; yet those who did enjoyed some success. Id. at 264-65. Mueller notes that
when the data, which does reveal some bargaining success, is subjected to close
scrutiny, it is evident that the small number of tenants who secured alteration in
these terms had only a limited degree of success and are generally persons whose
occupational skills make them better equipped than the average person for the
bargaining process.
Id. at 275. Most likely, these persons also had some choice of tenancies. Cf Steven A.
Arbittier, Note, The Form 50 Lease: Judicial Treatment of an Adhesion Contract, 111 U.
PA. L. REV. 1197, 1197 (1963) (discussing the elements of an adhesion lease).
174. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
175. Id. at 58.
176. Id. at 58-59.
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judgment that the state summary possession statute was unconstitutional
because it denied tenants due process of law.' 77 The plaintiffs argued that
certain provisions of the statute, such as those requiring a trial no later
than six days after service of the complaint unless security for accruing
rent is deposited with the court, limited the triable issues, precluded con-
sideration of defenses based on the landlord's breach of a duty to main-
tain the premises, and violated the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution. 178
In rejecting the due process claim, the Supreme Court explained that
procedural due process required only that there be an opportunity to
present every available defense. 179 The state statute provided such an
opportunity, but mandated a different forum and a different time for the
presentation. 8 ° According to the Court, nothing in the Constitution for-
bids a state "from treating the undertakings of the tenant and those of the
landlord as independent rather than dependent covenants.' 18 1
In response to the plaintiffs' assertion that the "need for decent shel-
ter" and "the right to retain peaceful possession of one's home" should
be recognized as fundamental interests, the Court stated that it was "un-
able to perceive ... any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of
a particular quality, or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy
the real property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease ... contrary
to the terms of the relevant agreement.' '
82
2. Implied Contract Right to Continued Possession
Establishing a right to continued possession beyond the lease term and
abandoning the termination or nonrenewal without cause rule may be the
next logical step in the "lease as a contract" paradigm. In this paradigm,
the landlord-tenant relationship is essentially an exchange of goods and
services, such as the physical premises and running water, for money con-
177. Id. at 59-60.
178. Id. at 64-67.
179. Id. at 65-66.
180. Id. at 66. The Court noted that its prior holdings found it "permissible to segre-
gate an action for possession of property from other actions arising out of the same factual
situation that may assert valid legal or equitable defenses or counterclaims." Id. at 67.
181. Id. at 68.
182. Id. at 74. Despite Lindsey, there continue to be arguments for constitutional rights
to such fundamental needs as housing, food, health care, and education. See Frank I.
Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659; Frank
I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of
Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973); William W. Van Alstyne, The Recrudescence of
Property Rights as the Foremost Principle of Civil Liberties: The First Decade of the Burger
Court, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1980, at 66.
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sideration (the rent). 83 At the center of the paradigm is the implied right
to the habitable condition of the premises during the stated term, based
upon the expectations of the parties in the context of modern urban hous-
ing conditions.' 84 This model facilitates an equally forceful argument for
an implied right to possession of housing beyond the stated term. In
Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,185 the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals pointed out that the common law no-repair rule had been super-
seded because its underlying factual assumptions were no longer valid. 86
The expectations of the landlord and the agrarian tenant at the time that
the rule was initially developed are different from those of the contempo-
rary landlord and the urban tenant. In the modern context of urban
housing shortages, the termination or nonrenewal without cause rule fails
to reflect the parties' expectations to the same extent as the no-repair
rule. At common law, the landlord's primary expectations were a market
rental and acceptable tenant behavior, while the tenant's primary expec-
tation was undisturbed possession during the term of the lease. In mod-
ern times, the tenant's expectations also include a habitable premises and
possession beyond the stated term. While the landlord's expectations do
not require termination or nonrenewal without cause, both of the modern
tenant's expectations are defeated by such a rule.
In Javins, the Supreme Court explained that the social policy underly-
ing the enactment of modern housing codes required abandonment of the
no-repair rule because the rule conflicted with the codified legislative pol-
icy against unsafe and unsanitary dwellings. 87 In the same sense, the ter-
mination or nonrenewal without cause rule conflicts with the equally
well-defined legislative policy against displacement and homelessness.
Moreover, the social impact of homelessness resulting from the termina-
183. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970).
184. See Humbach, supra note 32, at 1283-86. Even during the lease term, the contract
theory has produced the unfortunate situation where a default by the tenant can result in
the forfeiture of the estate. Under the common law rules, however, a tenant's right of
possession would nonetheless have to be terminated in accordance with a different and
more protective set of rules. Humbach explains that "[b]ecause the traditional conception
views the tenant as having a property right to possession, enforcement of a forfeiture for
nonpayment means that a property right, in this case the tenant's estate, must be termi-
nated." Id. at 1284 (footnote omitted).
185. 428 F.2d at 1071,
186. Id. at 1076-77. The court held: "In our judgment, the old no-repair rule cannot
coexist with the obligations imposed on the landlord by a typical modern housing code,
and must be abandoned in favor of an implied warranty of habitability." Id. (footnotes
omitted).
187. Id. at 1077-78.
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tion or nonrenewal without cause rule is equivalent to the social impact
of unsafe housing resulting from the no-repair rule.
The Javins Court further explained that freedom of contract has al-
ready yielded to greater societal concerns in other contractual situa-
tions. 188 Consumer protection and product liability laws, in recognition
of the unequal bargaining positions between buyer and seller and the
general societal interest in protecting the health and safety of citizens,
limit the exclusive right of private parties to determine the terms of their
bargain.189 Furthermore, under both state and federal statutes, neither
sellers nor renters of real property may refuse to sell, lease, or continue a
landlord-tenant relationship on the basis of the tenant's race, religion,
national origin, gender, or family composition to the extent that it in-
cludes children. 190 Therefore, an additional limitation on the right to
contract in the interest of preventing homelessness seems consistent with
these existing restrictions.
3. An Incident of the Property Interest in a Leasehold
A right to continued possession beyond the stated lease term is not a
property interest at common law, but it may be recognized as an incident
of the property interest in a leasehold. As social and economic conditions
have changed in the last several decades, the concept of property has un-
dergone a remarkable transition. As a result, the modern concept of
property is determined to a greater extent by reference to community
interests.191 Property is said to involve a bundle of rights inherent in a
person's relation to others with respect to a physical thing. In the context
of a leasehold, that bundle includes the right to possess, use, exclude
188. Id. at 1075 (citing the judicial adoption of implied warranties in the context of
contracts for the sale of goods).
189. Id. at 1079.
190. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3619 (1988); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(Supp. III 1991). In some jurisdictions, discrimination based on sexual orientation is pro-
hibited. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2515 (1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.22 (West Supp.
1993). These laws, however, may not preclude a landlord from refusing to rent to an un-
married heterosexual couple. See Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 728, 734
(S.D. I11. 1989) (holding that denying HIV-infected persons a special use permit for a resi-
dence violated the Fair Housing Act's prohibition against discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing on basis of the handicap of the buyer). See generally Matthew J. Smith,
Comment, The Wages of Living in Sin: Discrimination in Housing Against Unmarried
Couples, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1055 (1992) (reviewing the law's failure to prevent hous-
ing discrimination against unmarried couples).
191. See John E. Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of
Property, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1; see also Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation
in Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1530 (1989) (noting that property rights
may come to exist "principally in the form of specific use-rights").
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others, enjoy the fruits and profits, destroy, and alienate.'92 Although
these incidents of ownership are necessary for full ownership, as defined
by the existing legal framework, they are not necessary to constitute own-
ership per se because ownership can exist in various restricted senses.' 93
One might, for example, have the right to the income from a trust, but
not the right to the principal.' 94 Similarly, a person may have the right to
the income from real property that is leased but not the right to use or
possess the property.' 9 Moreover, each of the property incidents is sub-
ject to multiple definitions, such that the practical consequences of own-
ership are altered. 96 For example, the right to alienate may be limited by
rules regarding perpetuities or by prohibitions on racial discrimination.
The right to use may be limited by the existence of harmful effects pro-
duced by particular uses,19 7 or by a legislature's perception of the general
community interest.'98
Considerations of societal interest influenced the New Jersey Supreme
Court in an innovative opinion interpreting the right to exclude. In New
Jersey v. Shack,199 a landowner sought to invoke a state criminal trespass
statute to exclude staff of various organizations seeking to provide legal
and medical services to migrant laborers working on his land.2°° The
court held that the unauthorized entry by the staff was beyond the scope
of the criminal trespass statute because ownership of real property in
New Jersey does not include the right to bar access to governmental serv-
ices available to migrant workers.20' The court explained that
192. A.M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107-47 (A.G.
Guest ed., 1961). Actually, Honore maintains that the liberal conception of property em-
braces 11 elements. In addition to the rights mentioned, ownership also includes the right
to security (immunity from expropriation); the absence of term (the indeterminate length
of ownership); the prohibition of harmful use (the duty to forbear from using the thing in
certain ways harmful to others); liability to execution (for repayment of a debt); and resid-
uary character (the existence of rules governing the reversion of lapsed ownership rights).
Id.; see LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS, PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 18-19
(1977) (discussing Honore's account of property rights).
193. BECKER, supra note 192, at 19 (citing Honore).
194. Id.
195. Id. For example, one in bankruptcy might have the right to sell assets, but not the
right to give assets away. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988). Similarly, a sportsman might have
the right to give away wild fish or game caught or killed pursuant to his license, but not the
right to sell it. See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 3039, 7121 (West 1984 & Supp.
1994).
196. BECKER, supra note 192, at 19.
197. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 413-14 (1915) (upholding a munici-
pal ordinance prohibiting residents from brickmaking).
198. Zoning laws are the primary source of these limitations.
199. 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
200. Id. at 370-71.
201. Id. at 371-72.
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"[p]roperty rights serve human values. They are recognized to that end,
and are limited by it.""2 2 As such, a property owner's bundle of rights
will be confined by the government's interest in preserving the health and
welfare of its citizens.20 3 In its opinion, the court found "it unthinkable
that the farmer-employer can assert a right to isolate the migrant worker
in any respect significant for the worker's well-being., 2 4 While the
farmer is entitled to pursue his farming activities without interference, the
court could see "no legitimate need for a right in the farmer to deny the
worker the opportunity for aid available from federal, State, or local serv-
ices, or from recognized charitable groups seeking to assist him."2"5
The Shack opinion suggests that the dimensions of "property" are not
fixed;206 they are defined by societal conditions. The scarcity of land and,
by implication, the shortage of housing, increases society's stake in this
resource.20 7 As the concept of property evolves to respond to current
societal conditions, few believe that, after Javins, the nonfreehold estate
is the same as that known at common law. A further redefinition of the
concept would include, as an incident of the nonfreehold estate, the ten-
ant's right to continue in possession absent cause to evict. The prevailing
housing conditions seem to compel such a redefinition.20 8
Legislatures in New Jersey and the District of Columbia have taken an
important redefinitional step. They have altered the common law rules
pertaining to the tenancy for years and the periodic tenancy as to tenure
and duration.20 9 The New Jersey and District of Columbia anti-eviction
statutes deny a landlord the right to terminate a month-to-month ten-
ancy, except for good cause as specified by the statute.210 Good cause
includes failure to pay rent, destruction of the rental property, distur-
bance of neighbors, and breach of covenants in the lease. It does not,
202. Id. at 372.
203. Id. at 373 (quoting 5A RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 745,
at 493-94 (Patrick J. Rohan ed., 1994)).
204. Id. at 374.
205. Id.
206. Property interests are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that are grounded in an independent source, such as state law. See Texaco,
Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 525 (1982); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
207. See Cribbet, supra, note 191, at 3.
208. Under such a rule, a landlord would be entitled to increase the rent, although rent
levels would be constrained by the demand for housing. A proposed rent level that is
grossly in excess of the prevailing levels on comparable property could be scrutinized as a
pretext.
209. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-2551 (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West Supp.
1993).
210. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-2551(a); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1.
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however, include the landlord's desire to occupy the premises himself.21'
Rent control legislation 212 also includes some form of eviction control,
a variation on the right to continued possession. Typically, such legisla-
tion provides tenants in rent controlled buildings a right to renew their
lease and limits the landlord's eviction right to certain specified grounds.
These grounds include the resumption of possession for the landlord's
own occupancy, nonpayment of rent, serious tenant misconduct, removal
of the property from the housing market, and the failure of the tenant to
use the unit as a primary residence.213
IV. EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC HOUSING LAW
The public housing tenancy has undergone doctrinal changes in con-
211. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-2551(b)(i); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1(a) to (p).
Under the District of Columbia law, however, an owner of a residential unit who person-
ally seeks to occupy a unit can evict a tenant on these grounds. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-
2551(d). The New Jersey statute was upheld when challenged on constitutional grounds.
Puttrich v. Smith, 407 A.2d 842 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); Stamboulos v. McKee,
342 A.2d 529 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975). See generally Harold N. Hensel, Note, 11
SETON HALL L. REV. 311 (1980) (discussing the application and interpretation of New
Jersey's anti-eviction statute by New Jersey courts).
The New Jersey legislature enacted the eviction statute because:
At present, there are no limitations imposed by statute upon the reasons a
landlord may utilize to evict a tenant. As a result, residential tenants frequently
have been unfairly and arbitrarily ousted from housing quarters in which they
have been comfortable and where they have not caused any problems. This is a
serious matter, particularly now that there is a critical shortage of rental housing
space in New Jersey. This act shall limit the eviction of tenants by landlords to
reasonable grounds and provide that suitable notice shall be given to tenants
when an action for eviction is instituted by the landlord.
Hensel, Note, supra, at 312 n.11 (quoting N.J. Assembly Bill 1586 (1974)); cf. MINN. STAT.
§§ 566.02 to .17 (1988 & Supp. 1994) (setting forth remedies available to tenants for unlaw-
ful or forcible entry into tenements).
212. Rent control legislation began as a post-war, emergency measure to address the
shortage of available rental housing and the monopolistic effects of such shortages.
SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 113, § 7:1, at 502-03. During World War II, Congress authorized
the imposition of rent controls in much of the nation as part of its wartime price control
program. Id. When these federal controls were terminated in the late 1940s, they were
often replaced by state and local control. Unlike the earlier temporary wartime controls,
the new ordinances were designed to prevent expected perpetual inflationary rent in-
creases. See generally id., §§ 7:1-7:10, at 501-30 (providing an overview of the various types
of rent control legislation); Marc J. Korpus, Note, Rent Control and Landlords' Property
Rights: The Reasonable Return Doctrine Revived, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 165 (1980) (sug-
gesting that courts should require rents to be set at a level that would not force landlords
out of the housing market).
213. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 26-501 to -520 (McKinney 1987); see also SCHOSHIN-
SKI, supra note 113, § 7:10, at 528-30. Under typical rent control legislation, a landlord
must seek the approval of the administering agency before withdrawing a unit from the
market, even when his repair costs are overwhelming. Id.
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junction with the transformations in property, contract, and privacy law.
These transformations have developed simultaneously with changes in
the prevailing attitudes toward welfare and other government benefits.
Contrary to the "revolution" that dismantled aspects of the old private
lease law regime, the doctrinal changes occurring in public housing law
have been incremental. Once the movement began, however, the devel-
opment of the character and dimensions of the public housing tenancy
exceeded that of the private sector tenancy. Significantly, public housing
law rejected the termination or nonrenewal without cause rule. Thus, to
the low-income family, public housing law provides security of tenure,
some measure of economic stability, and a degree of personal autonomy.
A. Security of Tenure as a Constitutional Right
In 1937, the tenancies available to low-income families through public
housing programs resembled those existing in the private sector. Most
were month-to-month, periodic tenancies.214 Ironically, a family, which,
by virtue of its public housing eligibility, was unable to obtain housing on
the private market and would otherwise be homeless, could be evicted
from public housing with as little as ten days notice, without explanation
or cause.215 Some courts reinforced this policy by declaring that there
was no security of tenure 216 or constitutional right to continue living in
214. See Friedman, supra note 33, at 660.
215. See Chicago Hous. Auth. v. Stewart, 237 N.E.2d 463, 464-65 (Il1. 1968) (holding
that, absent a showing that the tenant was being evicted for exercising some constitution-
ally protected right, neither due process nor the HUD regulations required the housing
authority to furnish the tenant with the reasons for his eviction, prior to giving him notice
to vacate), vacated, 393 U.S. 482 (1969); see also Edward J. Fruchtman, Court Decisions, 7
J. Hous. 432 (1950) (citing cases upholding the power of housing authorities to evict ten-
ants without stating the grounds for eviction); Edward J. Fruchtman, Court Decisions, 6 J.
Hous. 150 (1949) (same). Until 1968, an applicant for public housing could be turned
away without explanation. In Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir.
1968), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an applicant
who is denied public housing is entitled to prompt notice and an opportunity for a hearing.
Id. at 267. Thereafter, Congress amended the Housing Act in accordance with the Holmes
decision. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-152, § 214, 83 Stat.
379, 389.
216. E.g., Walton v. City of Phoenix, 208 P.2d 309 (Ariz. 1949). The court stated:
It would certainly create an anomalous situation if a person once obtaining pos-
session had a continuing and indefinite right of tenure. To so construe the statute
would be to rule that a person after becoming a tenant need not care for the
premises and need not do anything except in accordance with his own will and
conscience, thus leaving the plaintiff powerless to perform its functions under the
Act and in effect negativing the purpose and the expressed intention of the
legislature.
Id. at 311.
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public housing projects.217 Other courts found it inconceivable that a
housing authority should be required to provide the tenant with a hearing
prior to each decision to increase the rent or to terminate a month-to-
month tenancy.218 For example, a New York court held that "tenants
[could] not, in a dispossess proceeding, litigate the propriety of the [hous-
ing] authority's determination that they were undesirable, or had failed to
pay rent or that there was some other authorized ground for
termination. 219
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether a public hous-
ing tenant has a vested property right entitling her to procedural safe-
guards prior to eviction in Thorpe v. Housing Authority.22 0 In Thorpe, a
tenant in a federally assisted housing project held a month-to-month
lease, which allowed the tenant to automatically renew for successive
one-month terms, provided that she maintained the same income level
and family composition and that she abided by the terms of the lease.221
The lease further provided that either the tenant or the housing authority
could terminate the lease by providing notice at least fifteen days prior to
the end of any monthly term.222
One day after the tenant in Thorpe was elected president of a tenants'
organization, the executive director of the housing authority, providing
no explanation, notified the tenant that her lease would terminate in fif-
teen days.223 The tenant was not informed of the basis for the executive
director's decision. While the termination proceedings were pending,
HUD issued a circular requiring that, prior to eviction, the PHA must
provide a tenant with the specific reasons for the action and an opportu-
217. See Chicago Hous. Auth., 122 N.E.2d at 524; Municipal Hous. Auth. v. Walck, 97
N.Y.S.2d 488 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950).
218. E.g., Smalls v. White Plains Hous. Auth., 230 N.Y.S.2d 106, 109 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1962) (citing Gefland v. New York City Hous. Auth., 111 N.Y.S.2d 256, 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1952)).
219. New York City Hous. Auth. v. Greenbaum, 140 N.Y.S.2d 321, 321-22 (N.Y. App.
Term 1955) (finding that the tenants could compel the landlord to prove that an authorized
ground for termination existed); see New York City Hous. Auth. v. Bernstein, 147 N.Y.S.2d
262, 262 (N.Y. App. Term 1955) (holding that the propriety of the housing authority's
determination of tenant ineligibility was reviewable, but was not open to question in a
summary proceeding); New York City Hous. Auth. v. Russ, 134 N.Y.S.2d 812, 813 (N.Y.
App. Term 1954) (holding that although tenant was denied a hearing, where the landlord's
tenant review board reached the decision to terminate the tenancy, the housing authority
was not required to offer evidence supporting its finding of nondesirability in a summary
proceeding).
220. 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
221. Id. at 270.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 271.
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nity to respond.2 24 The Supreme Court did not rule on the constitutional
issue raised by the tenant, but held that the HUD circular was binding on
the PHA, and that a tenant could not be evicted where the PHA had not
complied with the circular's requirements.225
One year after the Thorpe decision, the Supreme Court decided
Goldberg v. Kelly.226 The Court in Goldberg held that welfare benefits
are statutory entitlements, and that recipients of these benefits are enti-
tled to procedural due process before such benefits can be terminated.227
Three subsequent circuit court opinions addressed the Goldberg issue
and refined the dimensions of the constitutional rights of public housing
tenants.
1. Escalera
In Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority,228 tenants in a public
housing project held month-to-month tenancies that allowed for the ter-
224. Id. at 272.
225. Id. at 274. In the first Thorpe case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed
the eviction of the tenant. Housing Auth. v. Thorpe, 148 S.E.2d 290, 292 (N.C. 1966),
vacated, 386 U.S. 670 (1967). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated
the North Carolina Supreme Court judgment, and remanded the case for further determi-
nation in light of the newly adopted HUD circular containing new procedures for evicting
tenants. 386 U.S. 670, 673 (1967) [Thorpe I]. These new procedures then became the
subject of further litigation in Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268 (1969) [Thorpe II].
In Thorpe I, Justice Douglas seemed inclined, however, to definitively rule on the constitu-
tional question, stating that "[ilt is not dispositive to maintain that a private landlord might
terminate a lease at his pleasure. For this is government we are dealing with, and the
actions of government are circumscribed by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 386 U.S. at 678 (Douglas, J., concurring).
226. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
227. Id. at 262-63. Within a year of the Goldberg decision, the Court clearly distin-
guished entitlements and traditional property rights. Entitlements only exist to the extent
that the government chooses to offer them. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 479-
80 (1970). The rights of welfare recipients became more tenuous following the ruling in
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). In Wyman, the Court held that a welfare
caseworker's visit and search of the recipient's home without consent, without notice, and
without a warrant did not violate any rights granted by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 390.
228. 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970). A thoughtful and perhaps
ground-breaking state court decision preceded Escalera. Vinson v. Greenburgh Hous.
Auth., 288 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1968). In Vinson, the housing authority sought to terminate a
tenant's month-to-month tenancy by giving the required notice, but without stating a rea-
son. Id. at 161. When the tenant held over, the housing authority brought action. The
court ruled that the housing authority was not an ordinary landlord, and that "[w]hat may
be complete freedom of action under private contractual arrangements falls to restricted
action under public housing leases." Id. at 163 (citations omitted). The court explained
that the housing authority could not arbitrarily deprive a tenant of his right to continued
occupancy through the exercise of a contractual provision which terminates the lease. Id.
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mination of undesirable tenants with one month's notice.229 The housing
authority's policy provided that if, as a result of a tenant's undesirable
acts, a project manager recommended termination of the lease, the man-
ager would arrange a meeting with that tenant. 230 At this meeting, the
project manager would notify the tenant of his proposed recommenda-
tions, review any information in the tenant's file, and discuss the tenant's
undesirable activity.23' The tenant was then given an opportunity to ex-
plain his behavior. If, following the meeting, the project manager again
recommended termination for nondesirability, the tenant could submit a
written statement to accompany the project manager's recommendation
and the tenant's file, which would then be forwarded to the Housing Au-
thority Tenant Review Board (TRB).232
In this case, the New York City Housing Authority brought proceed-
ings against one tenant family, alleging that their son committed statutory
rape, against another tenant because of his arrest on a narcotics charge
that was not connected to the project, and against various other tenants
for failure to pay "additional rent., 233 Each tenant requested a hear-
ing;234 one tenant, however, demanded a variety of additional safeguards,
including advance notice of the charge, a hearing transcript, the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, and an impartial hearing exam-
iner.2 31 Although the TRB panel permitted this tenant's counsel to in-
229. Escalera, 425 F.2d at 857. A family was considered nondesirable if the behavior of
any member was considered
"a detriment to health, safety or morals of its neighbors or the community; an
adverse influence upon sound family and community life; a source of danger or a
cause of damage to the property of the Authority; a source of danger to the
peaceful occupation of other tenants, or a nuisance."
Id. at 857 n.1 (quoting TENANT REVIEW HANDBOOK, ch. VII, 1 I, App. B, at 4).
230. Id. at 857.
231. Id.
232. Id. If the TRB initially determined that a particular tenant was non-desirable, it
would notify the tenant in writing that it was" 'considering a recommendation' of termina-
tion," and that he could appear before the TRB to plead the merits of his case. Id. at 857-
58. A panel of three persons would conduct a hearing. Id. at 858. Instead of calling wit-
nesses, the housing authority simply read a summary of the tenant's file. Id. The tenant or
his representative was allowed to comment or to present and examine relevant witnesses.
Id. However, the tenant was generally not allowed to review the contents of his file, the
list of complainants against him, or the summary of the file entries. Id.
233. Id. at 859. Additional rent charges were assessed against tenants for clogging a
toilet, permitting undesirable behavior by a relative, playing ball on housing authority
property, and riding a bicycle on housing authority walkways. Id. at 860. The project man-
ager had the discretion to determine the amount of additional rent to be charged. Id. If he
believed an additional charge was warranted, he was authorized to impose such a charge
after providing the tenant with notice. Id. If the tenant failed to pay the additional
amount, the landlord could bring an action to collect the unpaid rent. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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spect his file, it did not grant the other requests, and the tenant refused to
proceed. Another tenant participated in the hearing even though he was
not permitted to inspect his file. Subsequently, he was found to be unde-
sirable, given notice of termination, and ordered to vacate the
premises.236
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered
procedural challenges to three different types of action taken by the hous-
ing authority: (1) termination for nondesirability; (2) termination for vio-
lation of rules and regulations; and (3) assessment of "additional rent" for
tenants' nondesirable acts.2 37 Addressing the question of whether the
housing authority procedures denied the tenants procedural due process,
the court distinguished the rules and procedures mandated by the HUD
circular, which were considered when Thorpe came to the Supreme Court
a second time, from the rules and procedures required by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 238 The court explained that the fact that the tenancy termi-
nation procedures in Thorpe satisfied the HUD circular requirements did
not conclusively determine the issue of whether the procedures satisfied
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirements.239 Nor did the
termination procedures foreclose a constitutional right to continued resi-
dence in public housing projects.24° According to the court, "[t]he gov-
ernment cannot deprive a private citizen of his continued tenancy,
without affording him adequate procedural safeguards even if public
housing could be deemed to be a privilege., 241 The court explained that
the nature of the particular government function and the substance of the
private interest affected will determine the "minimum procedural safe-
guards required by due process. ' '14  Under these principles, the court
held that the housing authority procedures for terminating tenancies on
the ground of nondesirability were deficient.243
236. Id.
237. Id. at 857.
238. Id. at 861.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970)).
242. Id. (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263).
243. Id. at 862. The court found the housing authority's procedures deficient for four
reasons. First, the court found the one-sentence summary notice to be inadequate in that it
did not notify a tenant of the nature of the evidence against him so that he could effectively
rebut that evidence. Id. Similarly, the court held that the project manager conference was
insufficient since the manager did not reveal all of the information contained in the file that
might influence the TRB decision. Id. Second, the provisions denying the tenant access to
the material in her file, upon which the TRB based its determination, violated due process.
Id. Such denial rendered the hearing at which the tenant is provided an opportunity to
rebut evidence against her meaningless because she had no knowledge of the material in
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The Second Circuit further found that the PHA's procedures for as-
sessing additional rent charges based on a tenant's nondesirable acts were
similarly inadequate. 244 It determined that the housing authority was un-
justified in failing to provide procedural safeguards merely because the
housing authority lease provided for additional rent charges. 245 The
court fashioned a rule favorable to public housing tenants, stating that
due process requires that a public housing tenant be afforded an adminis-
trative hearing on any proposed adverse action which could potentially
result in a deprivation of benefits, even if the tenant had recourse in a
state court.246 The court believed that an entitlement such as public
housing could not be adequately protected against wrongful deprivation
in a summary proceeding. The court remarked that "[t]he cost of defend-
ing in court and the hazards envisioned by a public housing tenant in
refusing to pay rent, would probably dissuade all but the boldest tenant
from contesting an 'additional rent' charge in this manner.,
247
2. Caulder
In Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority,248 the tenant held a lease
similar to those held by the tenants in Escalera. The lease provided for a
month-to-month tenancy, which was automatically renewed for the next
month unless either party gave notice fifteen days prior to the end of the
month.249 The housing authority advised the tenant that her lease would
be terminated because of complaints from anonymous neighbors.250 At a
subsequent hearing, the hearing commissioners denied the tenant's re-
quest to learn the nature of the specific allegations, the complainants'
names, and the procedural rules governing the hearing.25' The judge
her file. Id. Third, the denial of an opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses
who supplied the information in the tenant's file violated due process because "'[in al-
most every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process re-
quires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.' " Id. (quoting
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269). The housing authority rarely advised the tenant as to the
source of many of the entries in his file. Id. Finally, the court stated that failure to inform
the tenant of the rules and regulations governing the TRB panel would be improper when
"[t]he decision maker's conclusion ... must rely solely on the legal rules and evidence
adduced at the hearing." Id. at 863 (quoting Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271). The court con-
cluded that if this information is necessary for adequate trial preparation, the information
must be disclosed prior to the TRB hearing. Id.
244. Id. at 863-64.
245. Id. at 864.
246. Id. at 863-64.
247. Id. at 864.
248. 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971).
249. Id. at 1000.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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heard the evidence of the complaining witnesses in camera, and the ten-
ant did not have an opportunity to challenge or cross-examine these wit-
nesses. 252 Consequently, the tenant brought a suit challenging the
termination of her lease on the theory that she was denied due process of
law.253
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that
the Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly resolved any uncer-
tainty concerning the application of the Due Process Clause to the rights
of public housing tenants. 54 The court determined that the hearing was
procedurally flawed, and stated that "[t]he 'privilege' or the 'right' to oc-
cupy publicly subsidized low-rent housing seems to us to be no less enti-
tled to due process protection than entitlement to welfare benefits which
were the subject of decision in Goldberg or the other rights and privileges
referred to in Goldberg."'21' The court agreed with the Escalera deci-
sion256 and ruled that the tenants were entitled to specific procedural
safeguards, including timely and adequate notice specifically outlining the
reasons for the proposed termination, the right to cross-examine adverse
witnesses, the right to representation by counsel, the right to a hearing
decision based on evidence presented, the right to have the reasons for
the hearing decision and the evidence relied upon are set forth in writing,
and the right to a nonpartisan decision-maker. 257
3. Joy
While Escalera and Caulder are landmark decisions that defined the
required procedures to be used when public housing tenants faced ad-
verse action, neither case addressed the question of whether a PHA
needed a legitimate reason to evict a public housing tenant or to refuse to
renew a lease at the end of the term. In Escalera, resolution of these
issues was not necessary because the housing authority's own rules re-
quired that the tenant be found nondesirable.25 8 Similarly, in Caulder,
the court never reached the issue of whether it would require the PHA to
state a legitimate reason because the housing authority voluntarily of-
fered reasons for the termination.259 In Joy v. Davies, the United States
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1000-01.
254. Id. at 1002 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
255. Id. at 1003.
256. 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970); see supra notes 228-47 and
accompanying text.
257. Caulder, 433 F.2d at 1003-04.
258. Escalera, 425 F.2d 857.
259. Caulder, 433 F.2d at 1000-01.
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Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit answered the question left un-
resolved by Escalera and Caulder.26° In Joy, the tenant lived in a quasi-
public apartment project, constructed and operated with federal subsi-
dies.261 The tenant's lease provided that "[a]t the end of one year, lease is
automatically renewed from month to month [and] ... [e]ither party may
terminate lease at end of term or any successive term by giving 30 days'
notice in advance to other party., 262 In accordance with these provisions,
the landlord sought to terminate the tenant's lease at the end of the
term.263 The district court upheld the termination, finding that the tenant
"had no right of occupancy upon expiration of the term of the lease."
264
The district court also determined that the tenant was not entitled to pro-
cedural due process upon termination because she did not have a prop-
erty right in the lease extending beyond its term.
265
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the court concluded that procedural
due process only applied when a party was deprived of an interest pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore it was necessary to
determine whether the tenant had any such substantive right extending
beyond the lease term.266 Relying on the specific language of earlier
Supreme Court decisions articulating the standards for determining
whether a property right existed, the court stated that "[t]o have a prop-
erty interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an ab-
stract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement
to it."'26
7
For due process purposes, "[a] person's interest in a benefit is a 'prop-
erty' interest ... if there are such rules or mutually explicit understand-
ings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit." 268 To
determine whether such circumstances existed in Joy, the court looked to
the applicable statutes, governmental regulations, and the customs and
understandings of public landlords in the operation of their apartments.
The court determined that the legislative history of the housing subsidy
program supported its finding that a property interest may extend beyond
260. 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973).
261. Id. at 1237. The tenant was a participant in the Section 221(d)(3) Program of the
National Housing Act. Id. at 1237-38. This would be considered subsidized housing under
the typology offered earlier. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
262. Joy, 479 F.2d at 1238.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1239.
265. See id.
266. Id.
267. Id. (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
268. Id. at 1240 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972)).
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the stated term of the lease.2 69 Congress explicitly declared that "'[t]he
national goal ... [is to provide] a decent home and suitable living envi-
ronment for every American family.' ,270 Moreover, Congress expressed
its concern that no person be denied participation in public housing on
the basis of race, color, or national origin.27' The federal regulations also
imply a right to be free from arbitrary and discriminatory action, for ex-
ample, by prohibiting discrimination by a landlord against a family be-
cause of the presence of children.272 Further, the legislative history
indicates that a tenant should be allowed to continue occupying a subsi-
dized apartment even if she becomes ineligible for a government subsidy,
although she would then be required to pay the full rent.273 According to
the Joy court, "[t]he tenant's expectation of some degree of permanency,
[was] seemingly shared by Congress, if not by the landlord, [and was]
bolstered by 'custom,' " whereby eviction was the exception.274
The Joy court concluded that a tenant in a public housing project has
"a property right or entitlement to continue occupancy until there exists a
cause to evict other than the mere expiration of the lease., 275 Therefore,
"the lease provision purporting to give the landlord power to terminate
without cause at the expiration of a fixed term is invalid., 2 76 The court
explained that the reasoning in Caulder dictated its holding.277 Proce-
dural safeguards against deprivation of a property interest would be
meaningless if they could be circumvented simply by executing a lease
provision allowing for eviction without cause. The court concluded that
"[t]o allow a quasi public landlord to evict upon expiration of a fixed term
is to enable secret and silent discrimination and would wholly emasculate
... Caulder."278
Following the Fourth Circuit's decision in Joy, other courts declared
269. Id.
270. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1701t (1988)). Congress also intended to improve the
"living environment of urban areas" when it enacted the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1965. Id. "This [policy] includes adequate, safe, and sanitary quarters. But it also
implies an atmosphere of stability, security, neighborliness, and social justice.'" Id. (alter-
ation in original) (quoting McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (D. Mass. 1970),
affd in part, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971)).
271. Id. at 1240-41 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988)).
272. Id. at 1241 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 221.536 (1971)).
273. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 365, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965)).
274. Id. (footnote omitted).
275. Id. Therefore, an eviction seeking to deprive a tenant of this expectation consti-
tutes state action.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1242.
278. Id.; see Glover v. Hous. Auth., 444 F.2d 158, 161-62 n.4 (5th Cir. 1971). A public
housing tenancy may not be terminated in retaliation for tenant complaints to government
agencies or for engaging in protected speech. See, e.g., McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp.
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that the same expectation of permanency exists in tenancies under the
Section 8 Existing Housing Program.279 Similarly, HUD regulations now
provide that a public housing tenancy may only be terminated for serious
or repeated violations of the lease or other good cause. 280 According to
these regulations, a public housing tenant must be afforded an opportu-
nity to express his discontent concerning any dispute arising out of the
tenancy, except where a PHA seeks termination because the tenant is
engaged in criminal or drug-related criminal activity.28'
1122, 1130-32 (D. Mass. 1970), aff'd in part, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971); Holt v. Richmond
Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 266 F. Supp. 397, 400-01 (E.D. Va. 1966).
279. Notice, some type of pretermination hearing, and good cause are required to ter-
minate a tenancy under the Section 8 Existing Housing Programs. See Simmons v. Drew,
716 F.2d 1160, 1164 (7th Cir. 1983); Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d 1342, 1345-47
(4th Cir. 1982); Ferguson v. Metropolitan Dev. & Hous. Agency, 485 F. Supp. 517, 522-24
(M.D. Tenn. 1980). But see Hill v. Group Three Hous. Dev. Corp., 799 F.2d 385, 390-91
(8th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the proposition that Section 8 applicants have a property right
simply because of their status as low-income families); Eidson v. Pierce, 745 F.2d 453, 460
(7th Cir. 1984) (holding that Section 8 benefits applicants have no constitutionally pro-
tected property interests). See generally Note, Procedural Due Process in Government-
Subsidized Housing, 86 HARV. L. REV. 880 (1973) (explaining the rights afforded tenants
in subsidized housing); Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Tenant Selection Criterion Under
§ 8 of Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C.S. § 1437]), 80 A.L.R. FED. 470 (addressing the issue
of tenant selection under Section 8).
These constitutional rights function only when an application for housing benefits is
completed. In this highly regulated area, the application process is complicated and daunt-
ing for many. Uneducated or unsophisticated applicants may, through ignorance, fail to
complete the required documents and be denied benefits. However, because the purpose
of the Housing Act is to aid lower-income families in obtaining a decent place to live,
substantial compliance with the application requirements may be sufficient. See Brezina v.
Dowdall, 472 F. Supp. 82, 85 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (finding that a plaintiff who failed to complete
and sign HUD's application for obtaining another certificate of participation for the Sec-
tion 8 Program was nevertheless entitled to consideration and due process where she
otherwise notified the PHA that she sought continuation of benefits).
Public housing tenants may also use a section 1983 civil rights action as an enforcement
vehicle. See Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423-29
(1987) (finding that neither the Housing Act nor the Brooke Amendment precluded plain-
tiffs from bringing suit under section 1983). But see Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 556
F.2d 356, 360-61 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding that a mortgagee did not have a private cause of
action under the National Housing Act to enforce a contract with HUD); Kingston Square
Tenants Ass'n v. Tuskegee Gardens, Ltd., 792 F. Supp. 1566, 1571-73 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (find-
ing no implied private right of action in the Housing Act or the National Housing Act to
force HUD and the PHA to repair defects in the physical condition of the premises).
280. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(2)(i) (1993).
281. 24 C.F.R. § 966.51(a)(2)(i) (1993); see 24 C.F.R. § 966.50-.59 (1993) (detailing the
requirements to secure a hearing when a tenancy dispute arises); Housing Auth. v. Jackson,
749 F. Supp. 622, 634 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding that due process requires that public housing
tenants be provided a grievance hearing before eviction). A grievance is defined as "any
dispute which a tenant may have with respect to PHA action or failure to act in accordance
with the individual tenant's lease or PHA regulations which adversely affect the individual
tenant's rights, duties, welfare or status." 24 C.F.R. § 966.53(a). With the stated excep-
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In 1982, the Reagan administration proposed an extensive revision of
all federal regulations governing local PHA responsibilities.28 2 In partic-
ular, the administration proposed to limit the availability of grievance
procedures to disputes regarding rent calculation and tenant selection.28 3
These revisions also sought to eliminate administrative forums provided
by PHAs in which tenant complaints concerning PHA lease obligations
were made.28 4 In response to these proposals, Congress amended the
Housing Act to require PHAs to establish and maintain administrative
grievance procedures for the resolution of all tenant disputes concerning
adverse PHA action.285
The establishment of proprietary rights for public housing tenants,
which are now reinforced by the courts and embodied in statutes and
regulations, suggest that the public housing tenancy, the tenancy in subsi-
dized housing, and the Section 8 Existing Program tenancy are no longer
mere month-to-month tenancies, despite contrary language in any lease
agreement. Consequently, a tenant living in any of these types of housing
has a right to remain unless she breaches reasonable rules or no longer
meets the means requirements. More importantly, however, a public
housing tenant's right to continued possession, to notice of a proposed
eviction, and to an administrative hearing on such adverse action as out-
lined in Escalera, Caulder, and Joy, do not depend exclusively on HUD
regulations. Instead, these rights are based in the Constitution.
B. Economic Security
A public housing tenant is required by law to pay no more than thirty
percent of her income toward rent.286 This ceiling was imposed by the
tions, these procedures imposed by HUD are mandatory and must be extended to all
grievances arising between public housing tenants and PHAs. Id. § 966.51(a)(1). Gener-
ally, courts have found that administrative grievance procedures, which are calculated to
improve management-tenant relationships, promote improved housing to the advantage of
the public housing program. See, e.g., Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 188-
89 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Brown v. Housing Auth., 471 F.2d 63, 65-67 (7th Cir. 1972); Glover v.
Housing Auth., 444 F.2d 158, 161-62 (5th Cir. 1971); Sims v. Kemp, 781 F. Supp. 1264,
1267-68 (N.D. Iil. 1991).
282. 47 Fed. Reg. 55,689 (1982).
283. Id.
284. 47 Fed. Reg. 55,692 (1982).
285. House and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 204, 97 Stat.
1153, 1178 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k) (1988)). However in 1990, Con-
gress passed legislation permitting PHAs to exclude grievances based on drug-related and
criminal activity. National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat.
4079, 4185.
286. Section 1437a of the Housing Act provides that a lower-income family receiving
housing assistance shall pay the greater of the following amounts as rent:
(A) 30 per centum of the family's monthly adjusted income;
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Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act,28 7 which also committed the
federal government to pay PHAs any additional operating subsidies that
became necessary as a result of reduced rent collections caused by the
ceiling.288 When a tenant's rent is under the thirty percent ceiling, how-
ever, courts have held that no increase can become effective unless the
tenant is given notice and an opportunity to make written
presentations.289
(B) 10 per centum of the family's monthly income; or
(C) if the family is receiving payments for welfare assistance from a public
agency and a part of such payments, adjusted in accordance with the family's
actual housing costs, is specifically designated by such agency to meet the family's
housing costs, the portion of such payments which is so designated.
42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(1) (1988).
287. Pub. L. No. 91-152, § 213(b), 83 Stat. 379, 389 (1969) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1402(1) but subsequently omitted). Originally, the ceiling was 25%, but in 1981 it was
raised to 30%. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 322, 95
Stat. 357, 400 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(1) (1988)). See supra note 286.
288. The maximum rent charged is understood to cover both shelter and a reasonable
amount of utilities. Dorsey v. Housing Auth., 984 F.2d 622, 625 (4th Cir. 1993). When a
tenant exceeds the utility allowance, she is surcharged for the amount in excess of the
allowance. 24 C.F.R. § 965.477 (1993). The utility allowance is determined by the local
PHA in accordance with HUD regulations. Id. §§ 965.470-.480. The regulations require
the PHA to take into account relevant factors in establishing the allowances, including the
equipment and function to be covered by the allowance, the energy efficiency of PHA-
supplied appliances and equipment, climate, dwelling unit size, number of occupants, type
of construction and project design, the physical condition of the property, and the intended
temperature levels. Id. §§ 965.474, 965.476(a)-(d). The regulations further require the
PHA to maintain an administrative record documenting the basis for the allowances. Id.
§ 965.473(b). These records must be available for tenant inspection. Id. A PHA must give
notice to all tenants describing the basis for these determinations, including a statement of
the specific equipment used to calculate the allowances. Id. § 965.473(c). A PHA must
also afford all tenants an "opportunity to submit written comments during a period expir-
ing not less than 30 days prior to the proposed effective date of the Allowances ... or
revisions." Id.
The Supreme Court held that tenants could sue to enforce these provisions. Wright v.
Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987). In Wright, the tenants al-
leged that the housing authority violated HUD regulations by overbilling them for utility
services to which the tenants were entitled. Id. at 421. The tenants claimed they were
charged for "excess" utility consumption that should have been included in their rent. Id.;
see Dorsey, 984 F.2d at 629-30 (holding that tenants may sue based on the housing author-
ity's method of computing allowances, which was not in accordance with HUD's
regulations).
289. Compare Burr v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 479 F.2d 1165, 1169 (2d Cir.
1973) (holding that due process does not require an adversary hearing before a rent in-
crease but it does require notice) and Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626,639-41 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (holding that tenants have a right to be heard before a local housing authority
increases the rent) and Marshall v. Lynn, 497 F.2d 643, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that
tenants are entitled under the applicable statute and the constitution to a hearing before a
rent increase becomes effective), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 970 (1974) with Langevin v.
Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296, 300 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that neither the applicable
1994]
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In the private sector, rent levels, like prices of other commercial goods
and services, are a product of the economy. 29° Jurisdictions having rent
control legislation, however, are an exception because rent levels are to
some degree determined by the government. 291 Under many rent control
ordinances, landlords are allowed to impose a uniform maximum periodic
rent increase-a certain percentage each year as determined by a rent
control board.292 In setting the increase, the board considers the inflation
rate or the cost of living index, unusual changes in property taxes, utility
bills affecting the entire community, and other factors on the demand side
of the market, such as the unemployment rate.29
3
Accordingly, these rent control ordinances and the Housing Act provi-
sions regarding rent levels expand the property interest in public housing,
providing the low-income family with a measure of economic security
through procedural safeguards that must be met before rent levels are
increased. This expanded property interest places the public housing ten-
ant in a more favorable position than the private sector tenant in rent-
controlled housing and in a far better position than the private sector law
tenant who does not live in rent-controlled housing.
294
statute nor due process mandate that tenants be given a hearing before a proposed rent
increase becomes effective).
290. Between 1970 and 1983, the median rent increased at about twice the rate of the
median income. See Simons, supra note 4, at 269 n.38 (citing HOUSING TASK FORCE, supra
note 4, at 5).
291. Rent control ordinances typically identify some "base" rent for each rental unit in
the controlled area-often the rent being charged on a specific date before the ordinance
is enacted. When rental units are introduced into the market after the ordinance is in
effect, the base rent may be agreed to by the landlord and the first tenant. See N.Y. UN-
CONSOL. LAW § 8584(1) (McKinney 1987). The Supreme Court ruled that rent control
legislation does not effect a taking of property for which compensation is required, so long
as the landowner is assured a fair return on her investment. Pennell v. City of San Jose,
485 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1988). But see Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059,
1062-63 (N.Y.) (holding that rent control constituted a taking because it drastically inter-
fered with the owners' rights to possess and to exclude others from the property), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989).
292. RALPH E. BOYER ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 306 (4th ed. 1991).
293. See id. Section 5703.28(c) of the San Jose Municipal Ordinance 19,696, provides
that seven factors be considered: (1) the cost of servicing the landlord's debt (mortgage);
(2) the rental history of the unit; (3) the principal condition of the unit; (4) changes in the
amount of landlord-provided services; (5) any additional financial information supplied by
the landlord; (6) the market value for similar units; and (7) hardship to tenants. San Jose,
Cal., Ordinance 19,696 (1979), quoted in Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 5 (1987).
294. In New York City, 46.7% of all rent stabilized households paid 30.3% of their
income for rent; 32.3% paid more than 40%; and 24.3% paid more than 50%. Stephen
Dobkin, Confiscating Reality: The Illusion of Controls in the Big Apple, 54 BROOK. L. REV.
1249, 1249 n.1 (1989). The author derived these statistics from the Bureau of the Census,
Housing Division in 1987 and reported in the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey
77. Id.
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C. Security Against Involuntary Displacement
The public housing tenant is afforded security of tenure in several other
ways. Under applicable regulations, if some casualty renders the original
housing unit uninhabitable, the tenant is entitled to an alternative unit.295
If the tenant is forced to relocate because her building is destroyed or
demolished, she may be entitled to relocation assistance under the Relo-
cation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Act.29 6
A public housing tenant's security of tenure is also protected from indi-
rect termination efforts, such as demolition of the project. A PHA must
obtain HUD approval before it takes any action to demolish or dispose of
a public housing project.2 97 HUD may not approve a PHA application
for demolition unless the application was developed in consultation with
tenants in the project.298 Demolition is then permitted only if it is deter-
mined that the project or portion of the project to be demolished is obso-
lete as to physical condition, location, or other factors. Thus, the project's
condition must be unusable and unsalvageable for housing purposes. 299
295. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(h) (1993).
296. Pub. L. No. 91-646, 84 Stat. 1894 (1971) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4601-4655 (1988)). The Act provides relocation assistance to certain displaced persons.
Section 4601(6)(A) provides two definitions of a "displaced person," one of which is:
(i) any person who moves from real property, or moves his personal property
from real property-
(I) as a direct result of a written notice of intent to acquire or the acquisition of
such real property in whole or part for a program or project undertaken by a
Federal agency or with Federal financial assistance ....
42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(A)(i)(I).
Prior to the enactment of this statute, two other legislative provisions offered relocation
assistance. Amendments to the Federal Housing Act for relocation assistance, Pub. L. No.
91-609, § 212, 84 Stat. 1770, 1779 (1970) (repealed 1971), provided relocation assistance
benefits to persons displaced by urban renewal projects, and the Federal-Aid Highway Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-605, § 117, 84 Stat. 1713, 1724 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C.
§ 101 et seq.), provided assistance benefits in connection with federally aided highway con-
struction projects.
The Supreme Court ruled, however, that these benefits are limited to persons who have
been displaced" 'for a program or project undertaken by a federal agency.'" Alexander v.
United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 441 U.S. 39, 62-63 (1979) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 4601(6)). Only those persons forced to vacate property due to its acquisition for a fed-
eral program may receive benefits. See id. at 62; Jones v. United States Dep't of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 390 F. Supp. 579, 583 (E.D. La. 1974); see also Caramico v. Secretary of
United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 509 F.2d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating that
"construction programs are the type Congress had in mind in providing displaced person
assistance"). However, displaced person assistance is not available following HUD's ac-
quisition of property when a project sponsor defaults on federally insured loans. Alexan-
der, 441 U.S. at 63-67.
297. 24 C.F.R. § 970.4 (1993).
298. Id.
299. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(a)(1) (1988); 24 C.F.R. § 970.6. In Cole v. Lynn, 389 F. Supp. 99
1994]
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During the 1980s, some PHAs elected to demolish public housing
projects rather than undertake necessary repairs.3" Although PHAs
were required to make an informed decision to demolish, it was not until
1987 that PHAs and HUD were required to adopt plans to prevent re-
sulting tenant displacement and homelessness. In 1987, Congress passed
the Anti-Demolition Act to halt the razing of public housing projects and
to require construction or acquisition of replacement housing that could
be expected to last at least fifteen years.3 ' The Anti-Demolition Act
also regulates the de facto demolition of public housing projects, which
occurs when the housing becomes uninhabitable because of the failure to
maintain and repair, or to restrain deterioration.3" 2
(D.D.C.), enforced sub nom. Cole v. Hills, 396 F. Supp. 1235 (D.D.C. 1975), HUD sought
to demolish a housing project as economically infeasible. Id. at 101. The court granted the
tenants an injunction, which required HUD to discontinue demolition, restore already de-
molished units to minimally habitable conditions existing as of the date of HUD's decision
to demolish, and permit former tenants to return on the same terms. Id. at 105-06. The
court found that HUD failed to consider fully alternatives to demolition and to afford a
hearing to tenants. Id. at 103; see Marvin Krislov, Note, Ensuring Tenant Consultation
Before Public Housing is Demolished or Sold, 97 YALE L.J. 1745, 1763 (1988) (stating that
a litigant challenging HUD decisions must prove an abuse of discretion). But see Resident
Council v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 980 F.2d 1043, 1054 (5th Cir.) (find-
ing no private right of action to enforce the Frost-Leland Act because the Act was merely
an appropriations bill), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 75 (1993).
300. The Frost-Leland Amendment to the 1988 HUD-independent agencies appropria-
tions bill sought to prohibit HUD "from expending any money for demolition of 2,600
public housing units" in two congressional districts. 133 CONG. REc. H7741, H7742 (daily
ed. Sept. 22, 1987). The plan to demolish these projects was condemned as a
cynical action by the Reagan administration to eliminate one-third of the public
housing units in Dallas at a time when the problem of the homeless is increasing
and at a time when there is an increasing number of poor people in the seventh
largest city of the United States.
133 CONG. REC. H7745, H7774 (daily ed. Sept 22, 1987).
301. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242,
§ 121, 101 Stat. 1815, 1837-39 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437p,
1437p(b)(3)(A)(v), 1437p(b)(3)(B)); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 426, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 172
(1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3317, 3458, 3469. In Project B.A.S.I.C. v.
O'Rourke, 907 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1990), the PHA and HUD appealed the district court's
order setting a time schedule for the construction of replacement housing following demo-
lition of a public housing facility. Id. at 1243. A tenant advocacy organization sought an
injunction forbidding the housing authority from demolishing several high-rise towers on
the ground that the proposed demolition violated the federal statute. Id. at 1243-44. The
PHA and HUD argued that the district court misconstrued the statute in holding that the
replacement housing requirement applied to a demolition already approved or in progress
before the Act was amended. Id. at 1244. The United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit held that the Frost-Leland Amendment requiring a replacement plan did not
apply to post-amendment activities of the sort in this case. Id. at 1245; see Walker v.
United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 912 F.2d 819, 829-31 (5th Cir. 1990) (uphold-
ing Frost-Leland Amendment and Anti-Demolition Act).
302. See, e.g., Gomez v. Housing Auth., 805 F. Supp. 1363, 1375 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (find-
ing insufficient evidence of de facto demolition); Henry Homer Mothers Guild v. Chicago
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D. Individual Autonomy and Control
Prior to the 1960s, a public housing tenant had little personal autonomy
or control in public housing projects.3 °3 As the nation emerged from the
Depression, administrators of public housing, the courts, and the former
public housing tenant-the revived middle class-all seemed to share the
same hostility against the new class of tenants, the problem poor.31 Pub-
lic housing tenants were stereotyped as people who had low moral stan-
dards. Consequently, moral codes were adopted to screen undesirables
and to reclaim existing tenants. Housing authorities maintained policies
against illegitimacy, thereby denying admission to or threatening eviction
of a family if any member had a child out of wedlock. Similarly, housing
authorities imposed durational requirements for admission eligibility.3"5
These policies persisted until the late 1960s when the Supreme Court
made landmark privacy decisions that declared the right of individuals
to be free from governmental intrusion in fundamental, private
matters.3 ' The logic of this new jurisprudence displaced the aforemen-
Hous. Auth., 780 F. Supp. 511, 515 (N.D. III. 1991) (holding that § 1437(p) should be
broadly construed to include both actual and de facto demolition); Tinsley v. Kemp, 750 F.
Supp. 1001, 1012 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (holding that plaintiffs' claims of § 1437(p) violations
can be based on either actual or de facto demolition); Concerned Tenants Ass'n v. Pierce,
685 F. Supp. 316, 319-21 (D. Conn. 1988) (stating that § 1437(p) applies to either actual or
de facto demolition).
303. Charles A. Reich, Beyond the New Property: An Ecological View of Due Process,
56 BROOK. L. REV. 731, 736 (1990) (arguing that "[c]ontrol is as important as food and
shelter. Control is necessary to health, critical to self-esteem.").
304. See Public Housing, supra note 33 at 651-53.
305. See Thomas v. Housing Auth., 282 F. Supp. 575, 579 (E.D. Ark. 1967). In Thomas,
the plaintiffs complained that they were denied admission to housing because they were
mothers of illegitimate children. The court stated:
That evils result from slum living is generally accepted; the wide range of al-
leged evils need not be detailed here. The theory of the low rent housing pro-
gram is that if families of low income can be removed from the slums and placed
in safe, sanitary and decent housing they will be motivated and enabled to lead
better, healthier and more productive lives.
Id.
Although the court found the illegitimacy policy to be invalid because it was inflexible, it
stated that the housing authority was not required to ignore the fact that families with
illegitimate children were seeking admission to public housing. Id. at 581. The court sug-
gested that the housing authority may formulate a policy that gives some consideration to
the presence of illegitimate children in a family seeking public housing, particularly where
there were multiple illegitimate children, where they were recently born, and where the
births had followed each other in rapid succession. Id. For example, if a woman had three
illegitimate children in three years, the court reasoned that before admitting a woman's
family to tenancy in one of its facilities, a housing authority may require some assurance
that the family members would be acceptable tenants, notwithstanding the "past conduct
of the mother." Id.
306. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (addressing
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tioned housing authority policies.3" 7 Since then, HUD adopted regula-
tions3" 8 prohibiting PHAs from establishing or implementing tenant
selection criteria that exclude persons from public housing because they
are welfare recipients,30 9 are unwed mothers, 310 have a nontraditional
family composition,31' or have not lived as a family for a particular
duration.312
Other limitations on tenants' autonomy, however, persisted into the
1980s. For example, housing authorities adopted rules requiring public
choices in matters of family living arrangements); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-
66 (1973) (ruling on the right to an abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (addressing the right to privacy as to matters of procrea-
tion outside of the marital relationship); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1967) (ad-
dressing interracial marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965)
(addressing the right to privacy as to matters of procreation within the marital
relationship).
307. See Lewis v. Housing Auth., 397 F.2d 178, 181 (5th Cir. 1968) (addressing an ille-
gitimacy policy); Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 130 Cal. Rptr. 375, 379 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1976) (affirming the lower court's determination that local housing authorities may
not adopt a policy that automatically "den[ied] admission or continued occupancy to a
particular class, such as unmarried mothers, families having one or more children born out
of wedlock, families having police records or poor rent-paying habits, etc.").
308. 24 C.F.R. § 960.204 (1993).
309. See Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134, 137 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (finding that the housing authority violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment by rejecting applicants from a federally funded housing project solely
on the basis of their status as welfare recipients).
310. 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(c)(1).
311. Id.; see Hann v. Housing Auth., 709 F. Supp. 605, 606 (E.D. Pa. 1989). In Hann,
the unmarried, natural parents of three children applied as a couple for Section 8 benefits,
but were found to be ineligible because the housing authority did "'not accept common-
law relationships.' " Id. (citation omitted). The housing authority's board of commission-
ers determined "family" to mean "'two or more persons who will live together in the
dwelling and are related by blood, marriage or adoption.' " Id. (citation omitted). The
housing authority stated that the primary reason for this definition was the board of com-
missioner's belief that cohabitation was "immoral." Id. The court found, however, that
the housing authority did not have the statutory authority to adopt this regulatory defini-
tion. Id. at 608-09. The court concluded that the housing authority improperly sought to
advance its personal moral code, rather than some specific statutory policy or HUD direc-
tive. Id. at 609-10.
Moreover, the court found that HUD had previously recognized that unmarried couples
with children often create a positive family situation. The housing authority's definition of
family was so restrictive that it excluded those common-law relationships recognized under
state law as the equivalent of traditional marriages. Id. at 610. Statistics showed that more
than two million couples lived together in 1986 and that cohabitation was more likely
among those in the low- to lower- middle-economic classes. Allowing PHAs to exclude
this group from rental assistance would be unconscionable. Consequently, the court con-
cluded that Congress could not have intended such a result. Id.
312. James v. New York City Hous. Auth., 622 F. Supp. 1356, 1359-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(holding that mandatory duration-of-family composition requirements violated the Hous-
ing Act since the regulations did not permit selection criteria on that ground).
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housing tenants to seek management's approval of overnight guests
through a registration system. Management claimed that these rules were
necessary to maintain decent and affordable housing projects. In 1981,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that such
rules were invalid because they unduly infringed upon tenants' freedom
of association and intruded on their right of privacy. 313
E. Preferences Based on Hardships
Public housing tenants are afforded a preference in obtaining public
housing because they are entitled to assert personal circumstances and
hardships as factors motivating the decision to create the landlord-tenant
relationship. Applicants whose families have the greatest need are enti-
tled to priority for public housing. PHAs are required to give a tenancy
preference to applicants who are "involuntarily displaced, living in sub-
standard housing, or paying more than 50 percent of family income for
rent.
3 14
Prior to 1990, however, HUD allowed PHAs and private subsidized
landlords to disregard federal preferences in ten percent of their rental
units, which enabled them to direct some of the housing assistance to
higher-income families. 315 In 1990, Congress raised the local preference
allowance to thirty percent, but provided that the allowance could be
used only if PHAs and landlords followed the local preference system set
by a PHA after a public hearing. 316 Again in 1992, Congress raised the
number of units to be rented to local preference holders to fifty per-
cent.317 Private subsidized landlords, however, did not benefit from this
increase.318
313. McKenna v. Peekskill Hous. Auth., 647 F.2d 332, 336 (2d Cir. 1981). In McKenna,
the housing authority required tenants to disclose to the landlord the identities of every
individual they wished to have as an overnight guest, to have those guests approved under
a broad reasonableness standard, and to have the guests' identities recorded in their tenant
files. Id. at 333-34. While the court recognized the legitimate interests of the housing
authority in maintaining safe, decent housing, and in insuring that only authorized persons
occupied the units, it found that these requirements were not specifically calculated to
achieve those ends. Id. at 336.
314. 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(b)(4) (1993). These statutory preferences take priority over
other general admission criteria. See Pruticka v. Posner, 714 F. Supp. 119, 120-21 (D.N.J.
1989) (acknowledging statutory preferences); Gomez v. Housing Auth., 805 F. Supp. 1363,
1367 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (same).
315. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A) (1988) (amended 1990).
316. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A)(i) (Supp. 11 1990) (amended 1992). However, HUD
failed to implement regulations, which prompted Congress to pass legislation directing
HUD to adopt such regulations within six months. See Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 104, 106
Stat. 3672, 3684 (1992).
317. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
318. See id.
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In addition to priorities for certain preference holders, existing admis-
sion criteria require PHAs to select tenants in such a way that each pro-
ject is composed of families who represent a broad range of incomes and
rent-paying abilities, thus reflecting the range of incomes for lower-in-
come families in the project area.319 The ultimate objective of the in-
come-mix provision is to produce housing developments that are not
occupied exclusively by the very poor, but by a cross-section of lower
income households, representing a variety of household types.320 How-
ever, there was debate over the issue of the legality of an income-mix
objective that passes over applicants with lower incomes in order to select
higher-income applicants. Housing authorities argued that the income-
mix formula created a cross-section of occupancy that was an essential
ingredient in creating economically viable housing as well as a healthy
social environment. 321 The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit attempted to resolve this controversy in Paris v. United States De-
partment of Housing & Urban Development.322 In Paris, the court ac-
cepted the housing authorities' arguments, holding that an income-mix
policy was consistent with the policies and objectives of Housing Act.3 23
The Paris decision provoked substantial criticism. Congress responded
with legislation prohibiting a PHA from adopting or implementing poli-
cies that passed over very low-income families in favor of higher-income
families,3 24 or from holding units vacant to await higher-income appli-
cants when applicants from lower-income ranges are available. 325 Even
under this legislation, however, PHAs can use their local preferences to
319. 24 C.F.R. §§ 960.204(b), 960.205(c) (1993).
320. Id.
321. See Fletcher v. Housing Auth., 525 F.2d 532, 534 (6th Cir. 1975).
322. 843 F.2d 561 (lst Cir. 1988).
323. Id. at 569. The court rejected the argument that a conference report disapproving
of the preference for higher-income families indicated a congressional intent to repeal the
income-mixing provisions. Id. at 568-69.
324. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550,
§ 105, 106 Stat. 3672, 3684.
325. Congress overruled Paris in an amendment to the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless
Assistance Act Amendments. See Pub. L. No. 100-628, § 1001, 102 Stat. 3263 (1988)
(amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(c)(4)(A), 1437n(c) (1981), and codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437d(c)(4)(A)(i) (Supp. 111990)). The 1988 amendment provided that PHAs may not
by-pass the waiting list for the purpose of assisting higher-income families over lower-in-
come families. The conference report stated that these amendments were necessary in
light of the Paris decision. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1089, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 91-92 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4450, 4475-76. The 1988 amendment also was consistent
with earlier court decisions. See Gholston v. Housing Auth., 818 F.2d 776, 785-86 (11th
Cir. 1987) (holding that the preference provision was not self-executing and that local au-
thorities may grant the preference on their own initiative if it complies with the Homeless
Assistance Act); Tedder v. Housing Auth., 574 F. Supp. 240, 247 (W.D. Ky. 1983) (denying
a motion to dismiss a complaint containing these allegations).
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select higher-income applicants before applicants on waiting lists with
lower incomes.326
F. Control Over Governance and Condition of Premises
While many of the important public housing lease terms are deter-
mined by HUD, a public housing tenant retains some control over the
existence and content of other rules and policies that affect the ten-
ancy.327 A PHA may not adopt rules and policies governing the tenancy
unless it has first given notice of the proposed rules and allowed tenants
to comment.328 Current HUD policy encourages tenant participation in
the management of the PHA through resident councils, membership on
PHA governing boards, and resident management corporations.3 29
Moreover, the public housing tenant, like the private sector tenant, has
the right to insist on repairs and maintenance of the premises in a habita-
ble condition.33 ° While courts have declined to find an implied warranty
326. See 24 C.F.R. § 960.205(c)(8) (1993).
327. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (1993) (setting forth public housing lease requirements).
328. 24 C.F.R. § 966.5 (1993).
329. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 964.100, 964.110, 964.120; see, e.g., N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW § 30(5)
(requiring two members of the housing authority's governing body to be tenants). See
generally Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Final Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,622 (1994) (to be
codified at 24 C.F.R. §§ 905, 913, 964, 990) (improving programs for tenant participation
and opportunity).
330. When the issue of habitability in public housing projects was first raised, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the theory of an implied
warranty of habitability in public housing leases. Alexander v. United States Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 555 F.2d 166, 167 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 441 U.S. 39 (1979). In
Alexander, tenants sued HUD claiming that they were entitled to relocation benefits under
the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act because
their housing project was beyond repair. Id. at 168. They sought to have their security
deposits returned. The court rejected arguments supporting an implied warranty of habita-
bility, reasoning that in contrast to housing projects in the private sector, construction and
operation of public housing effectuates a stated national policy" 'to remedy the unsafe and
insanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings
for families of low income.'" Id. at 171 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1401). The court concluded
that if it implied a warranty of habitability into these leases, it would be insinuating that the
stated national policy objectives had and were being met. Id. The court believed that such
a warranty was best left to the legislature. Id. The court further rejected arguments that
the national policy imposed affirmative obligations upon HUD to maintain suitable dwell-
ings, concluding that these words only conveyed Congress' lofty objectives. Id.
Thus, Alexander created an anomaly. While Congress aimed to provide a decent, safe
living environment through the Housing Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988), under Alexan-
der, Congress apparently had imposed no obligation to maintain or to ensure that the
public housing was, in fact, decent or safe. Not surprisingly, few courts followed Alexander
to the extent of relieving public housing landlords of all responsibility over the condition of
the premises. Instead, courts enforced state law warranties of habitability to the extent
that they were consistent with federal housing law. See Mann v. Pierce, 803 F.2d 1552,
1556 (11th Cir. 1986); Federal Property Management Corp. v. Harris, 603 F.2d 1226, 1229
19941
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of habitability under the Housing Act, they have adopted state law war-
ranties as the federal rule of decision governing the condition of federally
sponsored public housing.331
V. PRIVATIZATION MEANS SHIFT FROM PUBLIC HOUSING LAW "TO
PRIVATE LEASE LAW
Privatization of federal housing assistance would entail a shift from in-
kind housing benefits to demand-side benefits. For low-income families,
privatization would also involve a shift in the legal rules governing the
landlord-tenant relationship from public housing law, with its statutory,
constitutional, and regulatory protections, to private lease law. The re-
(6th Cir. 1979); Techer v. Roberts-Harris, 83 F.R.D. 124, 128-29 (D. Conn. 1979); Chase v.
Theodore Mayer Bros., 592 F. Supp. 90, 96 (S.D. Ohio 1983). But see Ramos Perez v.
United States, 594 F.2d 280, 287-88 (1st Cir. 1979) (finding that HUD was under no affirm-
ative duty to keep tenants safe). See generally Rachel Camber, Note, The Incorporation of
the Implied Warranty of Habitability in Public Housing Programs, 38 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 205 (1990) (analyzing courts' incorporation of the implied warranty of habita-
bility under state law and proposing that Congress should amend the federal housing laws
to incorporate such a warranty).
331. In the most recent significant ruling on the issue, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit rejected Alexander and adopted state law warranties as the fed-
eral rule of decision in suits seeking the enforcement of the Housing Act. Conille v.
Secretary of United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 840 F.2d 105, 108 (1st Cir. 1988).
In Conille, the tenant alleged that HUD failed to maintain her apartment in a habitable
condition and thereby breached an implied warranty of habitability and infringed on her
right of quiet enjoyment. Id. at 108. The court stated that the general rule requires that
federal law be applied to a controversy concerning the rights or obligations of the United
States under a lease, which was entered into in the furtherance of the national housing
programs. Id. at 109. If the contractual obligations of the United States are not addressed
by statute, but are resolvable under state law without any conflict with federal policy, then
state law is said to be " 'incorporated as the federal rule of decision.' " Id. at 110 (quoting
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979)). The court found that noth-
ing in the statute purported to regulate contractual relations in any way between the Secre-
tary of HUD, as landlord, and his tenants under HUD leases. Id. at 111. Since Congress
did not comprehensively occupy the field of landlord-tenant law, it had not preempted a
judicially fashioned federal rule. Id. Therefore, state law, including the warranty of habit-
ability, would be applied as the federal rule to the extent that it did not conflict with the
federal statute. Id. at 114. But see Kingston Square Tenants Ass'n v. Tuskegee Gardens,
Ltd., 792 F. Supp. 1566, 1547 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (adopting the reasoning of Alexander).
While other courts have recognized a federal common law warranty of habitability, they
limited the remedies available for a breach of the warranty. These remedies usually in-
clude the equitable enforcement of lease obligations to provide decent, safe, and sanitary
housing, excluding monetary damages designed to address a prior breach. See Chase, 592
F. Supp. at 97.
Public housing tenants also sued housing authorities in actions seeking enforcement of
local housing, health, and safety codes. See generally Otto J. Hetzel, The Search for Effec-
tive and Cost-Efficient Housing Strategies: Enforcing Housing Condition Standards
Through Code Inspections at Time of Sale or Transfer, 36 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNrrEMP.
L. 25 (1989) (advocating inspections at the time of sale as a means of enforcement).
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moval of the government as a party to the landlord-tenant relationship
would cause this shift in governing legal rules. As a result, the rights and
protections available to the low-income family would be limited to those
now available under private lease law. Private lease law does not ade-
quately address the needs of public housing tenants. It offers few solu-
tions to their problems. Despite chronic housing shortages, private lease
law provides no security of tenure, and no control over the cost of hous-
ing for tenants who do not live in rent-controlled housing. The new rights
that private lease law does bestow, such as the right to insist on repairs
during the lease term, may have little practical meaning to the low-in-
come family. In other words, while private lease law gives the tenant a
warranty for repairs and contract rights upon which to insist on repairs,
she may have to resort to litigation in order to enforce these rights. In-
deed, the tenant may have to settle for money damages or the right to
quit the premises if the landlord is unwilling or unable to perform his
lease obligations. While private lease law gives the tenant a remedy
against invidious discrimination, she is still faced with rejection on
grounds that may be arbitrary, elitist, unduly strict, or insensitive to her
particular needs.
Thus, while the rules governing the landlord-tenant relationship would
change doctrinally, the only practical difference would be a change in the
public character of the lessor. The imperatives underlying the protections
afforded by public housing law, however, would continue. On the practi-
cal level, those facets of public housing law that provide security of tenure
and control exist not only because the government is involved, but be-
cause of the needs of the low-income family.332 Under privatization, the
harsh and persistent aspects of private lease law as described here could
operate to exclude low-income families from safe, affordable housing.
The resulting exacerbation of the housing problem should serve as a
needed impetus for further reform of private lease law. Unfortunately,
much of the costs of achieving such reform would fall on those tenants
originally disadvantaged by the common law, but who are now aided by
public housing law.
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1994, more than fifteen percent of the nation's population lives in
poverty.333 For most of these families and individuals, the American
332. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
333. Robert Pear, Poverty in U.S. Grew Faster than Population Last Year, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 1993, at A20. In 1991, 14.2% of all Americans and 21.8% of all children lived below
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dream of home ownership is an elusive concept, an impossible goal.334
Unfortunately, increasing poverty has meant that millions of Americans
may not even have the option of obtaining a rental unit in the private
market.335 Public housing programs have attempted to address the hous-
ing issues confronting low-income families. Through these programs, mil-
lions of families are provided a decent place to live that would otherwise
be unavailable on the private rental market.
Public housing law has evolved to serve human needs, as all law should.
The public housing tenancy promises security of tenure in safe, decent,
and affordable housing. Moreover, it enables the individual to control
some of the circumstances in his life. Public housing programs can cer-
tainly be criticized on the basis of the quality and the performance of the
programs. But any failing is not simply a function of public ownership
and does not justify privatization, given the attendant noneconomic
the official poverty line. Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solu-
tions, 71 N.C, L. REV. 1351, 1362-64 (1993).
334. Most poor people rent housing, spending a larger share of their income on housing
than other groups. In 1987, one report noted that 63% of poverty-level households were
renters. See HOUSING TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 5. According to 1984 census data, the
median income of public housing tenants was 51% of the homeowner median, decreasing
from 65% in 1970. Michael Harloe, Private Rental Housing, in HANDBOOK OF HOUSING,
supra note 4, at 131, 134; see GEORGE STERNLIEB & JAMES W. HUGHES, AMERICA'S
HOUSING: PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS 72 (1980) (reporting similar statistics from 1978 cen-
sus data). In 1983, more than half of low-income renters spent more than 50% of their
income on rent. See Simons, supra note 4, at 268 (citing HOUSING TASK FORCE, supra
note 4, at 6); see also PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 7 (reporting similar
statistics).
Most of these renters find themselves trapped in the inner city. David Listoken, A State-
ment of Appropriate Private and Public Responses to Urban Housing Needs, 36 WASH. U.
J. URB. & CONTEMP. LAW 63, 64 (1989). The number of poor persons living in the nation's
50 largest cities rose by 12% between 1969 and 1979. Id. at 67. During this same period,
the population in areas where over half of the residents were poor increased by 75%. Id.;
Harloe, supra, at 132-33 (providing a history of the private rental market and explaining
how this market emerged as a product of capitalist urbanization).
335. According to the 1989 American Housing Survey, 4.3 million households received
public housing assistance or subsidized housing from the federal, state, or local govern-
ment. STATE OF HOUSING, supra note 4, at 16. Yet in 1991, sources reported 35.7 million
people living in poverty. See Pear, supra note 333.
Other characteristics that distinguish renters from homeowners and public housing from
private sector renters include gender, family composition, and race. One-third of all renter
households are single-person households, compared with one-sixth of homeowner house-
holds. Harloe, supra note 334, at 133. While more than 70% of the homeowners were
members of households consisting of married couples with or without children, only 38%
of renter households were such. Id. at 134. Additionally, the majority of all female-
headed households live in rental housing, and one-half of all black- and Hispanic-headed
households rent. Id. (citing UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 1984, Tables A-7, A-
9); see HUGHES & STERNLIEB, supra note 334, at 14-16 (reporting 56.4% of all black fami-
lies renting compared to 32.3% of white households based on 1976 census data).
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losses. Instead, any failings are correctable by adequate operating subsi-
dies to PHAs, additional appropriations for subsidized housing, increased
tenant involvement in management, and improved design and construc-
tion quality standards. If such corrections are made, public housing pro-
grams that include in-kind benefits and provide security of tenure and
control should be continued and expanded, at least until the anachronistic
aspects of the common law have been corrected.

